Aircraft: Cessna 172. Injuries: None. Location: Miami, Fla. Aircraft damage: Substantial.
What reportedly happened: A flight instructor was attempting to demonstrate short field landing technique to a student pilot.
About 50 feet over the runway, at an airspeed of 60 knots, with flaps fully deployed, the CFI reduced the throttle to idle and pitched the nose down to “increase airspeed” and flare the airplane.
Immediately after reducing the engine power to idle, the airplane “sunk,” and the CFI responded with a full throttle application.
However, the airplane was too close to the ground and the engine did not respond in time to prevent a hard landing.
Probable cause: The CFI’s improper power management during a steep, obstacle-clearance approach, which resulted in a hard landing.
NTSB Identification: ERA13CA044
This October 2012 accident report is are provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
I hear it all from those of you commenting here. There is no correct or wrong explanation. As a low time student [less 100 hrs and over 60] it still comes down to feeling what the airplane is doing and flying it to the conditions at that time. Experience, practice, practice; the air monkeys can grab at any time. .
I don’t get it. I’m not a pilot, someone please explain. If the plane was trimmed for 60 k, wouldn’t cutting the throttle automatically cause it to nose down and sink, at a trimmed 60k? Why would the CFI be surprised?
I bet it was a really short landing, though. He should get kudos for that.
Angle of attack will determine at what speed the airplane stalls, airspeed-wise. It may stall at 55, 58, 62, or 65 K. depending, in this case, on the sudden (rate of) transformation of pitch attitude, from a nose-down attitude to a nose-up (by inducing the flare just prior to touching down). This “transformation range” will (should) depend on the rate of sink just prior to the flare for touchdown. This is called, “landing the aircraft”. Yes, I know, we are supposed to be teaching students a ‘stabilized approach’ which negates all this previous verbiage, i.e., it should be a “stabilized approach from over the obstruction(s) all the way to the point of flare. To me, that’s a bit theoretical. No two landings are the same …. (if they were, we would be soloing students after two or three landings). The term, “improper power management” covers a broad multitude of operational sins. Improper power management occurred when the PIC was not sufficiently clairvoyant of the instantaneous developments due to the minimal airspeed.used. Who knows. The aircraft may have suddenly encountered a slight ‘downdraft’. In some circles, we call that “squirrelly air”.
The “probable cause”, ie. improper power management was likely not the reason for the accident. The write-up said that the airspeed was 60 knots but that is highly questionable because had the airspeed actually been 60 knots then the airplane would not have stalled with full flaps. The key to a successful landing is maintaining the airspeed at a safe margin above the dirty stall speed right up to when the flare is begun. This isn’t about “power management”. What actually happened here is that there was probably too much looking outside the aircraft and not enough looking at the airspeed indicator and even more importantly the attitude of the aircraft and the airspeed deteriorated to the point that a stall happened too late to recover with power. Go figure.
The poor power management was not the only reason of the crash. He must also begin the maneuver closer to ground. Because the plane has low speed and about to stall.
From the brief description of the scenerio/circumstances, it appears that the instructor was a low time pilot him/herself. One must assume he/she was demonstrating an obstruction such as high tree or powerline …. in which case you leave the power on (still at MINIMUM speed over the obstruction) and do the flare (with power) … THEN chop the power, after the flare, or maybe use some additional power during the flare, depending on the rate of descent from over the obstruction.. I don’t give a rats rump what some misguided previous instructor told this instructor. I will submit that there is way too much “simulation” going on and to really learn the process, one must perform these techniques under REAL circumstances …. which is nearly impossible using today’s “FAA approved/funded airfields with pristine clean approaches” … (which is necessary for continued FAA funding). There … I said it. Move to Alaska if you really want to learn short field approaches. Or, find a nice short landing strip in the good ole USA … which I am sure, the use of which, would not be covered under the flight school’s insurance.