The pilot of a Piper Arrow and a passenger were attempting to fly a night instrument cross-country flight over Delaware. The pilot estimated the flight would take three hours 45 minutes. He planned to carry five and half hours of fuel onboard.
About three hours and 20 minutes into the flight, when the airplane was about 15 miles from the destination airport, the pilot diverted after the plane ahead of him performed a missed approach due to the low ceiling
He diverted to a nearby airport where the wind was calm and the ceiling was overcast at 400 feet AGL. The airport was equipped with an ILS approach, however, the pilot elected to attempt two GPS approaches. During both approaches, he performed missed approaches before the airplane reached the published decision altitude of 306 feet AGL.
Then, about 4 hours 20 minutes into the flight, the pilot diverted again, to an airport with a GPS approach and a reported overcast layer of clouds at 300 feet AGL. He attempted a GPS approach, and this time descended below the approach’s published minimum descent altitude of 310 feel AGL, to about 250 feet AGL, before he performed a missed approach.
After the missed approach, and about five hours into the flight, he advised the air traffic controller that he was low on fuel and diverted to another airport to attempt a VOR approach. He was cleared for the VOR approach about five hours five minutes into the flight.
Six minutes later the pilot declared an emergency, reporting fuel exhaustion. The airplane crashed in wooded terrain about two miles from the runway, killing the pilot.
On the last leg of the flight the pilot was in contact with air traffic control and could have declared an emergency and performed an ILS approach to a military airport that he overflew en route to the airport with the VOR approach, but he did not.
The NTSB attributed the accident to the pilot’s failure to land the airplane at multiple airports that were equipped with adequate instrument approach procedures while operating in low instrument meteorological conditions and his delay in declaring a fuel-related emergency, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
NTSB Identification: ERA13LA111
This January 2013 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
I enjoyed reading all the comments … they all have merit. However I have problems calling “ATC” the “FAA” ,,, they are hired by the FAA, but their job is NOT to necessarily see to it that the pilot adheres to the “FAA rules” … that’s strictly the pilot’s responsibility. ATC’s job is to provide the pilot the necessary guidance, vectors, traffic separation, etc. within the IFR system and other certain airspaces. It seems to me that the pilot simply did not have the real sense of urgency (call it mental acuity ….. training ??, to have a life-and-death grasp of the situation .. the situation in knowing just how much fuel you have on board .. and conduct one’s operations accordingly .. and not play around with REAL weather. Of course, it is possible that the glide slope was inoperative in the aircraft and the pilot figured the GPS had just as low of minimums. I can tell you the NTSB reports sometimes don’t give the whole story .. I won’t go any further on that.
As part of my Instrument Instruction technique during the course of instrument training, I have the instrument applicant set up a steady, stabilized, descent on, say, an ILS approach … through the DH (and pay little attention to the glideslope needle) and on down to 5/10 feet off the runway … to show them that it is possible to get the plane down on the ground ON THE RUNWAY … IN AN EMERGENCY situation .. relatively if not completely intact. Hey, did you know that, on a federally funded airport with an ILS, you’re supposed to have a 500 ft. primary surface on EITHER (that’s both sides of) the runway free of plane-bending obstacles (runway light fixtures/standards are supposed to be designed to NOT ‘ding’ the aircraft too bad.) Things are supposed to be ‘frangible’ in the 1000 ft wide primary surface, associated with a runway with a precision (ILS) approach.
Don’t agree Tom. It would have been better had he or she declared a problem after the first alternate didn’t work out. His or her decision to make multiple approaches at multiple airports just sealed the deal. After the first alternate didn’t work it was time for an urgent request for ATC assistance to locate any airport with well above minimum approaches. After the next airport where it didn’t work out as hoped (never a good strategy to depend upon hope with your life in the balance) it was time to declare an emergency and open up more runway options…
You have drunk the FAA Kool Aid. Yes the pilot was making some mistakes. But what makes you think that he wouldn’t just keep on making them? For in fact that was just what happened and I would say that the FAA just sat there and didn’t do anything for the pilot’s “safety”. That’s what they say they are for – “safety”. The systemic error should be evident to everyone. You can’t depend on the regulations and your memory of them to keep you out of trouble. You are really on your own out there as this case proves. If you don’t have a viable strategy to get yourself out of trouble using common sense then you are toast because the FAA won’t do anything except to protect the rules that they govern. This case is a classic example of it and your blaming the pilot when the FAA could have done something is unconscionable. Declare an emergency? Too late for that “procedure”.
It would have better that the pilot descended below the decision altitude and then down onto the runway rather than running out of fuel and crashing in the woods and killing himself. Additionally, the FAA was negligent in not recommending he do this rather than running out of fuel. Moreover the FAA could have insisted on the pilot being vectored to a safe runway even if zero/zero. Better that than crashing into the woods and dying.