Before the flight, the pilot obtained weather information for an airport near the departure airport and for an airport about 275 miles south along his route of flight. He did not file a flight plan, did not receive any other services for the flight, and departed in night visual meteorological conditions.
According to GPS and air traffic control data, the Piper PA-30 was flying on a southwesterly heading before it turned right. It subsequently turned left and then right before it entered a descending left turn and hit terrain near Biglerville, Pa., killing both people on board the airplane.
Examinations of the airframe and engines revealed no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Further, there was no evidence of a medical impairment that would have affected the pilot’s performance. A review of the his logbooks revealed no entries for night or instrument flight in the year before the accident.
A National Weather Service observation from about 15 miles southwest of the accident site showed rapidly changing conditions with a band of snow moving across the region at the time of the accident
In addition, the next observation showed a lowering ceiling that was overcast to broken from 3,200 to 2,800 feet above ground level; snow started falling about 26 minutes after the accident.
Considering the weather conditions around the time of the accident, it is likely the pilot inadvertently encountered instrument meteorological conditions in light snow with no visible surface lights and, as a result, had to transition to relying solely on the instruments.
Given these conditions, his limited instrument and night experience, and the pilot’s maneuvering, it is likely that he experienced spatial disorientation and subsequently entered a descending left turn and lost control of the airplane.
The NTSB determined the probable cause as the non-instrument-rated pilot’s spatial disorientation after inadvertently encountering instrument meteorological conditions at night and his subsequent loss of airplane control.
NTSB Identification: ERA14FA077
This December 2013 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
Does the 3 hours of simulated instrument flying required for a pilot certificate need to be increased? Does simulated instrument flying need to be a mandatory portion of the biennial flight review? It seems like this happens enough that it should be addressed head on, even though I don’t like the idea of increasing governmental regulations.
I guess the GA community just has to get used to the fact that a certain sector will continue to do this, regardless of any education we offer to the contrary.
At the expense of sounding calloused, it could be the Darwinian Factor.“
There are way too many “re-runs” for this type of accident. Why do some pilots keep doing this same thing over and over? It’s doubly sad when they do it and take someone else with them to eternity.
Why do people drive drunk? Why do people do other stupid stuff every day of the year? Pilots aren’t immune to stupidity.
Why indeed do people continue to do the same thing over and over again while expecting a different result? Because by definition, that’s insanity. It’s insane to risk one’s life and that of someone else who’s along for the ride to go flying when it’s dark out with no instrument rating and/or currency and no means of being aware of approaching IMC conditions that would likely be encountered based on available weather information prior to takeoff. It’s a perfect gamble setup to be flying along fat dumb and happy and plow into thick continuous clouds, be taken by total surprise and then panic in an attempt to reverse course and exit the blacked out conditions except for the distracting reflection of position lights and/or strobes while losing all orientation as to which is up or down. Thence gravity takes over and with no effective aerodynamic countering of the inevitable earthward descent violently demonstrates which is which. We always return to terra firma one way or another, hopefully in full control of our flying machine and not out of control as happened in this unfortunate but recurring accident scenario.