The private pilot was flying a night visual pattern to a non-towered airport in Lancaster, Texas.
Due to another airplane on final approach, he extended the downwind leg to create spacing. While on the extended final in a rural area with low lighting, he descended the airplane well below a proper glidepath to the runway and hit an unlit high-voltage power line about a mile from the runway.
After feeling a jolt, the passenger deployed the airframe’s parachute system. The airplane subsequently became suspended in a second set of power lines, and the pilot and passenger safely left the airplane. The passenger was seriously injured in the crash, which destroyed the airplane.
At the time of the accident, the precision approach path indicators (PAPI) for both runways were inoperative due to maintenance.
A notice to airmen (NOTAM) for the PAPI closure was active at the time of the accident, and the pilot was aware of the NOTAM.
The dark conditions and extended final likely created a visual illusion in which the pilot thought he was higher than he was. Without an operative PAPI, he had limited external references to assist him in maintaining a proper glidepath during the approach.
Probable cause: The pilot’s failure to maintain a proper glidepath during a night visual approach, which resulted in impact with a power line. Contributing to the accident was an inoperative precision approach path indicator.
NTSB Identification: CEN16LA016
This October 2015 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
So the absence of a VASI or PAPI is to blame? I assume he had an altimeter and a VSI. The black hole syndrome and the illusion of being high is a direct result of spending far too much attention on the external view when there’s little there to see or help. Treat the approach not as a visual but an instrument approach with distance (GPS?) versus altitude for a 3 degree GS as a starting point of reference steeper if there obstacles along the approach path or simply break it off and climb up overhead the airport and wait for traffic to clear then spiral down for a normal approach without the need to extend downwind.
I was surprised by “the passenger deployed the…parachute”, but John’s comment about the passenger being the pilot’s wife makes that a little more clear. The parachute’s role in helping or hurting the situation is very interesting, and I like hearing that part of this discussion.
Thankful my field has pilot-controlled lighting, runway lights are always on medium-intensity. The set of events that led to this collision is exactly why when I’m doing currency landings, I try to practice a few night landings without the PAPIs illuminated before I turn them on. I want to be prepared and calm in the event I’m flying at night and I have to divert to a field where there are none, or they are INOP.
This was a classic ‘Black Hole’ approach. It’s not entirely clear from the accident report or docket, but it appears the pilot was unaware of the NOTAM about the PAPI being out of service. The pilot dragged it in and hit the static line above the power lines. He admitted in his pilot/operator 6120.1 Report that he wasn’t monitoring his altimeter, which suggests he wasn’t really tuned to where he was in relation to the field elevation during his approach to land.
He and his pax were lucky. While his wife (the pax) pulled the chute handle immediately after feeling a “jolt”, it’s not clear how exactly that helped since they were already well below the canopy minimum deployment altitude. Not addressed at all in any of the NTSB public documents is how the chute may have tangled up with the powerlines, suspending the aircraft above the ground (and preventing a hard nose first impact), but then caused in arcing in the powerlines which resulted in the post crash fire. The pilot’s 6120.1 Report said a ‘small grass fire’ was burning near the plane when he and his wife jumped the “8 or 9 feet” from the pilot-side door to the ground. The aircraft was not on fire at that time, however by the next morning, except for the engine and prop, images in the docket show that it was pretty much reduced to ash.
It’s an interesting accident. I doubt Cirrus or the chute manufacturer anticipated how firing the rocket after a power line strike might both save the day AND result in a post crash fire. It’s also interesting that the airbag in the shoulder harness of the passenger failed to protect her from serious injury. She suffered a broken collarbone which apparently resulted from the single crossbody shoulder harness (again, not mentioned in the report, but a reasonable speculation).
“firing the rocket after a power line strike..result in a post crash fire” There is no evidence the chute deployment caused the fire. It is likely the plane was suspended with the aid of the chute which no doubt saved their lives.
The air bag shoulder belts will only deploy when the occupant is lurched forward with a lot of force, as happens when a plane noses into the ground. Its a dual shoulder three point belt. http://www.aviationoccupantsafety.com/forward-facing.html
Read the news reports published immediately following the report, and read the accident report + docket documents. Again, the details of how the grass fire mentioned by the pilot in his report and in the NTSB Final are not specifically mentioned. However the airplane and fire arrived concurrently, and the airplane was NOT on fire when the pilot and pax exited. The pilot described the fire as “small” when he exited, and later reports described the fire as contained at 5 acres (i.e. not ‘small’). Ergo, an event connected with the airplane’s arrival (rocket with metal cable fired upward and then descending downward due to gravity… on the and across powerlines and static line) is the most likely explanation for a post crash grass fire. Basic fire investigator stuff.
Another set of lives saved by the Cirrus chute.