The flight instructor and student pilot departed their home airport with about 34 gallons of fuel on board the Piper PA-28 for a planned 60-mile, round-trip, cross-country instructional flight.
The student pilot reported that, after landing at the destination airport, they completed two more full-stop landings before returning to, and then landing uneventfully at, the airport in Lawrenceville, Georgia.
The flight instructor wanted the student pilot to complete one more landing before concluding the lesson. The student stated that, during the subsequent takeoff, everything seemed normal until he turned the airplane onto the crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern, at which time the engine lost all power.
The flight instructor then took control of the airplane. He reported that he chose not to attempt to turn back and glide to the airport because the airplane was about 500 feet above ground level.
He subsequently performed a forced landing straight ahead into trees. Both fuel tanks were compromised during the impact, and the fuel quantity at impact could not be determined.
Subsequently, an engine test run was performed with no anomalies noted.
Both pilots reported that they did not switch the fuel tanks following the total loss of engine power.
The student pilot further stated that the airplane “ran out of gas.”
Review of performance information for the make and model airplane revealed that, based on the reported fuel onboard the airplane at the beginning of the day, it should have had between five and 10 gallons of fuel remaining at the time of the accident.
Although the amount of fuel in each fuel tank could not be determined, the loss of engine power likely resulted from a lack of available fuel in the selected tank.
Because the flight instructor was the pilot-in-command and told the student to conduct another landing, he should have been more cognizant of the fuel level in the tanks.
Probable cause: The flight instructor’s inadequate fuel management, which resulted in a total loss of engine power during initial climb due to fuel starvation and a subsequent forced landing.
NTSB Identification: ERA16LA051
This November 2015 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
Any flight instructor involved in a fuel starvation incident should lose their certification plain and simple. In addition, at 500′ AGL a turn to the airport could have been accomplished.
ONCE, about 1950, I was on a cross-country in a Beech C-45, but flying at only about 1500 feet, when both engines quit. The rest of the more knowledgeable crew was in back playing poker. I continued to fly the airplane when a hand reached into the cockpit, switched tanks, hit the “wabble pump” a few strokes, and both engines begin to “purr” again. I regained the 300 feet of altitude lost. The game went on and we reached our destination. Switching tanks should be the first reaction.
Switching tanks is just as important as making sure you have the correct fuel reserves. Turning back is NEVER an option when low to the ground.
Have to disagree, turning back from 500 feet when already turning through 90 degrees could have been an option. Proper attention to fuel management would have eliminated the entire event however.
Yup…more stupid pilot tricks !!
Fuel on board should be measured in hours, not gallons.
Pilots must know the fuel burn rate in GPH in cruise, and that pattern work will use substantially less.
Use a timer set to count down from the hours of fuel on board, or as in my old Cessna, set your clock to 12-noon on engine start. Then a glance at the clock will tell you how many hours you’ve been flying.
Learning to switch tanks has to be part of initial pilot training. Even in a Cessna, with gravity fuel flow, we start on the left tank, taxi on the right, and takeoff on ‘both’…..pretty simple to learn.
JIm, I assume you meant to say that “pattern work will require substantially MORE” fuel than typical cruise flight. Time for one circuit, full power 1/3, cruise power 1/3, low power to power off 1/3. No way it’ll use less fuel than 3/3 at cruise power. Otherwise your method is right on.
Well, at least the CFI managed to get them down without serious injury or worse. But not keeping an eye on the fuel selector? Every checklist has included in it a requirement to ensure the fuel selector is on the fullest tank prior to takeoff. And emergency procedures typically have included in them a requirement to switch the fuel selector should the engine quit in flight. Good possibility they could have made it back to the runway from 500 ft. AGL on the crosswind leg but won’t fault the decision to land straight ahead.
So what did we learn today, kids? We learned that flight instructors can be idiots, too.