The pilot in the multiengine, retractable-gear-equipped airplane reported that he was flying in instrument meteorological conditions and leveled off at 8,000′ mean sea level.
He began to configure the Piper PA-34 for cruise flight, then realized that the right engine cross-feed fuel selector was positioned for the left tank. The left tank fuel indicator displayed empty, and the right fuel indicator displayed 45 gallons remaining.
He believed that the fuel indicators had malfunctioned, and he established an approach to a nearby highway intersection. The pilot landed with the landing gear stowed on the asphalt highway near Llano, Texas.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower fuselage longerons.
Per the National Transportation Safety Board Pilot Aircraft Accident Report, the pilot reported that he became complacent during the flight and vowed to use a checklist in the future.
The pilot has coordinated with his local FAA Safety Team to help prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future.
The pilot added there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause: The pilot’s complacency during the en route phase of flight, which resulted in fuel mismanagement and a subsequent gear-up landing.
NTSB Identification: GAA17CA233
This April 2017 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
The pilot’s written statement and the accident summary do not corroborate. Check the “Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1” at this link:
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/dockList.cfm?mKey=9500
It sounds like he never realized the crossfeed lever was turned. Making this flight several times his expectation bias said, “The gauges are wrong I always have an hour of fuel at this point” and that’s right when BOTH engines stopped and it became an emergency. He glided to the highway intersection.
The summary makes it sound like he knew what the problem was, that both engines were still running and he decided to do an off airport landing anyways.
That is some serious editorial summarizing on the part of the NTSB to say the least and puts the incident in a very different light. From my own education as related to an engine out landing in complex aircraft, the gear stays up until a safe landing is assured. That landing gear can raise drag considerably and better to land gear up on good terrain then gear down in the trees. Still even the most basic GUMP check, even if most of those letters did not apply, would have told the pilot to drop the gear once he was safely lined up.
One would like to think that a pilot with this level of experience would not be so complacent even in an emergency situation. Just look to the famous Miracle on the Hudson, those pilots were in deep stuff but they kept their heads and still ran the checklists to attempt engine restart in the time they had left and stayed professional through it all. Sure they had years more experience and excellent training but we should all aspire to that level of professionalism every time we get in the cockpit. For most of us flying is not our profession but flying requires professionalism or it will find your shortcomings and smack you to the ground, literally.
The link doesn’t seem to work anymore, so here’s another one that should take you to the pilot’s statement.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=456609&docketID=60353&mkey=95009
Thanks for that link and having also read the full narrative I could not agree with your conclusions. That synopsis that the NTSB prepared, which was parroted back in this article, makes the situation sound like a major stupid event rather then just a stupid event. It is disheartening that the pilot totally ignored the checklist for engine failure. I do not have a copy to recite from but I am sure it would include such basics as selecting an alternate feed position on the fuel selector to search for fuel while turning on boost pumps and such. Those are the very basic steps that any pilot should do automatically from memory without even taking the time to drag the checklist. Even the airlines have those short lists that the crews should have committed to memory as you do not always have the time to search for the right emergency procedure. If he had taken the time to pull out his flashlight and look at the fuel selector positions he would have seen that he really did have those 45 gallons and by switching both engines to that tank avert what could have easily been a fatal landing.
Oh I meant to say I could not agree more with your conclusions. Sorry for that change in tone. I wish they would provide those links so we can get a look at the details and not have to relie on the synopsis which was very poorly written in this case.
Pull the parachute!
Sounds like a real dumb attack or what’s known as an Amtrak commercial for his passengers. Says a lot for doing a station check every :12-:15 like we used to do in the early 20 Series Learjet (a fuel emergency looking for a place to happen). The station check included fuel, hydraulics, electrical, pressurization with weather updates every other check in case of sudden diversion.
Another example why retractable gear is an obsolete and costly element of the old GA aircraft designs. Insurance companies know this and punish anyone who is unwise enough to try to own and operate one.
There are just too many jaw dropping decisions here. He needs to have his ticket pulled; retraining here is more than indicated.
who teaches these people how to think?? land off piste with 45 gallons of fuel???
I wonder how much fuel was actually remaining in the tanks when he landed? It sounds like he made an emergency out of nothing, and in a twin. If I were the FAA, it would be a re-ride with a heavy focus on flight planning and single-engine performance.
“The pilot added there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.” UGH!
My father would always say “that it was the fault of the nut holding the wheel.”