The non-instrument-rated pilot was on a cross-country flight in a Cessna 210. Earlier on the morning of the accident, he diverted from his intended destination airport because of poor weather there.
After waiting at the diversion airport for about 1.5 hours, he decided to attempt the 35-mile flight to the destination airport. During taxi, he called a friend to ask about weather conditions close to the destination airport, and the friend advised the pilot that “pretty low clouds” existed.
He departed and remained at a low altitude until about 3 minutes before the accident, when air traffic control radar captured the airplane’s altitude at 800 feet above ground level (agl).
During the last minute of recorded data, the plane made a climbing left turn of about 90° from an altitude of 1,000 to 2,100 feet and slowed from a groundspeed of 144 to 106 knots.
A witness near the accident site in Bradley, S.D., heard what sounded to be an airplane climbing and descending twice, which was followed by the sound of a “loud bang.”
The airplane hit terrain with a nose-down attitude at high speed, and a post-crash fire ensued. The pilot died in the crash.
Post-accident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
Even though the available evidence indicated that the pilot did not request a weather briefing or receive weather information from a vendor, he should have known, before the start of the flight, that instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) would likely exist near his destination based on the information that his friend provided.
The weather conditions at the closest official reporting station to the accident site at the time of the accident indicated a 500-foot cloud ceiling and reduced visibility due to mist. AIRMETs indicated that instrument flight rules conditions existed. This information confirmed that the accident airplane was in IMC at the time of the accident.
On a previous flight, the pilot had intentionally flown into IMC conditions with the autopilot on.
Probable cause: The non-instrument-rated pilot’s improper decision to conduct a flight in which instrument meteorological conditions existed along the route of flight, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a loss of airplane control.
NTSB Identification: CEN19FA021
This November 2018 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
In Late 2000 my second-oldest cousin decided to scud-run over low SoCal mountains to the open skies of the Mojave desert. It was too much time/effort to file IFR and he was in a hurry! He never made it: he crashed climbing/wings almost level into a mountain pasture. When the wreckage flipped-over it crushed the cabin ‘flat’.
My oldest cousin, also a pilot, had to retrieve his brother’s body from the local morgue, deal with the FAA and NTSB, deal with the aircraft wreckage and insurance, notify relatives [especially their elderly parents], arrange for the funeral… and ultimately deal with his younger brother’s estate and children [no will]. My cousin’s ill advised flight into IMC in the mountains led to a terrible sad family mess that was entirely preventable.
This needless fatality invokes a couple of timeless aviation adages.
“There are old pilots and bold pilots but very few old bold pilots”
“I’d rather be on the ground wishing I was in the air than in the air wishing I was on the ground”.
Just about every pilot has been in that situation at least once and most of us old timers have been there numerous times. It’s almost always a gut wrenching decision. You initiated the flight for a specific and often important purpose, and there will be consequences for not completing it as planned. It might be that you’ll miss a business appointment or sleeping in your own bed rather than a motel room. The reasons for accepting the risk that the weather might not be as bad as forecast are good ones. What all too often causes the decision maker to make the wrong choice is the attitude of “I can handle this”. The real culprit is that none of us can envision dying…. that only happens to those other idiots who took off knowing the flight would be risky. The simple fact is, NO risk should be acceptable when it can be avoided by tying down the aircraft and waiting for the circumstances to improve until the flight can be made safely.
After reading this and other similar accident reports, most of us likely ask ourselves would we have done the proper thing in that situation. Would we have allowed the pressure to get there and the perceived estimation of our own flying skills overcome that voice telling us “This is a bad idea”.
What makes accident reports such as this one so valuable is that we can benefit from the wrong decisions those pilots made and be reminded that it could happen to us if we don’t prioritize safety above all other considerations.
Changing “bold” to “stupid” would be more accurate….just as most “old sayings” are in and of themselves rather stupid.
Underlying all the poor decisions is Get thereitis. So sad for his family and all of our insurance rates. He landed and waited and then succumbed to the killer attitude. I too suspect many past bad decisions turned out OK for him. We have to reward ourselves for choosing not to fly and holding to conservative personal minimums. Stop the chain early and pat yourself on the back.
It appears VFR to IMC and Fuel mismanagement are on top of the lists of GA mishaps.
I wonder what would happen if for BFRs non-instrument rated pilots had to fly under the hood for 5 minutes by hand. Or were given at least two unusual attitudes to recover from while under the hood. Would this change the number of VFR pilots into IMC crashes?
If one is Instrument rated, hood work is fair game with a BFR.
Good suggestion and one that should be incorporated in the BFR.
Agree. Actually those maneuvers are included in AC 61-98D as guidance for instructors giving a BFR.
Suicide by aircraft, plain and simple. He was scud running and literally ASKED for it.
VFR into IMC remains a primary cause in fatal GA accidents. This case is rather blatant, as a weather brief was not even considered. It’s unsaid, but we could probably assume this particular pilot had been able to ‘scud-run’ successfully, and maybe habitually in the past.
Given the aircraft, A Cessna 210 with autopilot – why wasn’t this pilot IFR rated?
Why wouldn’t he get a decent weather review?
Could his ‘friend’ have provided a stronger, more negative recommendation?
I wonder about his last Flight Review, were weather, weather resources, planning, and personal minimums discussed? A Strategy for exiting IMC if inadvertently encountered? Things all covered in primary training, but how often reviewed and emphasized on flight reviews?
Would any of that have made a difference? In some cases, some pilots, are just destined to make these poor decisions, and suffer the consequences. Maybe in other cases, some of these actions
Looking at the sectional and Google Maps, except for one tower up to 1705′ agl, that general route looks tempting for a low weather type of flight – flat terrain, multiple large distinctive lakes, and a highway that can be followed directly to the destination airport. But that depends on experience and a reliable weather observation – neither airport reports weather. The emphasis for some time now has been to carefully consider all options. I don’t know if there was a rental car available at the departure point, but he had a friend at his destination which was only a 40 minute drive away – would that have been an option.
Color this one IMC inadvertant suicide…plain aviation truth.