Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions leading to pilot spatial disorientation continue to be a leading cause of fatal helicopter accidents.
From 2000 to 2019 in the United States, there were 130 fatal accidents directly linked to the issue of spatial disorientation. These accidents occurred regardless of pilot experience and they cut across all industries, including Emergency Medical Services, law enforcement, tour operations, utility flights, corporate flying, and personal/private flights, according to officials with the U.S. Helicopter Safety Team.
“For decades, studies, articles, research papers, and discussions have been published theorizing why accidents related to degraded visual environments consistently occur and it has been hard to find clear answers that can slow or stop these tragic accidents,” explains Nick Mayhew, industry co-chair of the U.S. Helicopter Safety Team. “In part, the accidents stem from failed planning, lack of understanding, or poor decision-making. All pilots have the option to turn down a flight before launch, turn around, proceed to an alternate, or land in a safe place if the weather deteriorates below company or personal minimums, yet we continue to see these types of accidents.”
In response to this situation, the U.S. Helicopter Safety Team developed a new Recommended Practices document focusing on “Spatial Disorientation Induced by a Degraded Visual Environment” and offering training and decision-making solutions.
“We are proposing a shift in the way we discuss, train, and react to deteriorating or unplanned weather conditions,” adds Mayhew.
The Recommended Practices document (https://ushst.org/56secs/) focuses on these training and decision-making actions:
- Avoidance of IIMC
- Preflight planning that includes enroute decision processes
- In-aircraft training that simulates a lack of visibility
- Training of recovery techniques and committing to instruments
Avoidance of IIMC
Avoidance is the best defense, officials note. There are several tools at a pilot’s disposal to ensure they put themselves, the crew, and the safety of their passengers in the best position for a successful flight. Often, that may be opting to delay or cancel the launch based on conditions present or anticipated during the flight. These decisions can be difficult to make, but when a pilot conducts a thorough preflight analysis, the preponderance of evidence can make that risk management decision straightforward and data-based.
Preflight Planning that Includes Enroute Decision Processes
Enroute Decision Triggers can be defined as a pre-determined set of conditions that “trigger” a decision point in the flight. When a preset decision trigger is reached, the pilot executes a predetermined action that was planned, briefed, and reviewed while at the planning table.
The enroute decision triggers should be planned early in the preflight planning process to prevent other factors to impact them. These decisions should be planned and discussed for every flight – not just the flights where you anticipate weather to be an issue.
In-Aircraft Training that Simulates a Lack of Visibility
To be best prepared for a degraded visual environment, the USHST recommends a framework on which to build a comprehensive training program. This includes a no-visibility simulation while in-aircraft, simulators that offer visual illusion training, and simulations that expose pilots to visual illusions and affect their vestibular system.
Training of Recovery Techniques and Committing to Instruments
The best techniques for survival of spatial disorientation encounters is to avoid them. However, with proper training, pilots can be more successful in trusting instruments. For pilots to trust their instruments, they have to train the brain to disregard the vestibular illusions experienced during spatial disorientation. This is accomplished by simultaneously exposing a pilot to visual and vestibular illusions in training. This exposure will provide the brain the training it requires to function in “fast brain” and successfully disregard the conflicting illusions and focus on the instruments.
The USHST Recommended Practice document is intended to provide an initial framework for future training packages aimed at reducing helicopter accidents stemming from spatial disorientation.
A video from the USHST shows how quickly things can go wrong for pilots. Check it out here.
as you stated – “it was a stupid mistake” – most will agree that – “it’s hard to fix stupid”
About 15 years ago, a CFI friend and mentor and I had a save. VFR low time private pilot was worried about flying back home in deteriorating wx. He had his wife and 2 young daughters. The pressure was his mother in law and wife who were screaming about the daughters needing to be at a dance recital. Perfect fatal picture. Jack told to me talk to him while he calmed the wife and mother in law down. I offered to drive him to local Cl C airport and get a rental car and even to return the plane when the wx was better. Finally we got through to the pilot and he decided to drive over the protests of wife and mother in law. The next weekend when he came to retrieve the plane he hunted us down and thanked us for saving their lives. He ran into fog along the coast during the drive home. It was a hard sell but worth the effort. Jack has gone west but I will never forget him taking charge and making the save happen. His USAF training kicked in and he made a great decision for a very uncertain and pressured pilot.
How to prevent inadvertently flying into IMC?
(1) Maintaining situational awareness at all times
(2) Avoiding distractions
(3) Understanding and avoiding low light (landings after sunset, whiteouts in snow and ice)
(4) Don’t fly airplanes when stressed out, tired, sleepy or don’t feel well
I acknowledge that training is a benefit. I agree that the Pilots have options, fixed wing or helicopter. Introducing standards during IFR approaches for commercial operations have reduced accidents.
So How does Human Nature influence Decision making in these accidents. “Stress, Fatigue, Hubris, Distractions” are examples that lead to poor or contrary decision making.
Accidents like:
The Boss has a Dinner in Aspen; Gulfstream fatal short final. ‘Below minimums’.
A Dark, snowy, high, down wind IFR approach: 737 runs off Midway Runway. Ground fatality.
Kobe Bryant accident. Question, is the pilot embarrassed that he can not deliver his boss to his home? Pilot chooses to continue flight.? Is job in jeopardy?
Many accidents are not equipment failure but distractions from piloting performance. “Will I loose my job” , “I’ve never performed this task in these circumstances”, “Let’s depart and check the weather”, “Intentional Flight below minimums”.
I have observed and experienced these Human Factors in my 50 yrs in aviation. My flying expectations are modified by my experiences. Perhaps reading selected accident reports will help influence pilot choices during their career.
Last example: In the 50s Mike Todd died in his personal Constellation over the Grand Canyon in a Thunderstorm. …. The same day a corporation CEO planned a similar flight to the west coast in their Constellation. Due to weather forecasts, the pilots refused and were given notice. The reported tragic news the following day changed the thinking of some people.
Mike Todd’s plane was a much smaller Lockheed Lodestar, not a Connie. And it crashed near Grants New Mexico, not the Grand Canyon.
It was extremely overloaded in heavy icing conditions when it lost an engine at an altitude where one engine could not sustain flight, especially ice up.
Thanks, the point is; from a safety perspective, one pilot’s decision was to Go vs one to Not Go. … We all make choices. Today Our choices may be technically better informed, but human nature has not changed. NTSB does not research the implied distraction or stress leading to poor decisions. The wrong choice is Pilot Error.
… As you point out, the choices were: overloaded departure, entered thunderstorm, encountered icing leading to lost engine power and lift….
WHY WOULD YOU DO THAT FLIGHT? HOW DO WE FIX STUPID DECISIONS?
Long time ago I was in the back seat of a C172 flown by a VFR pilot as he flew into IMC (a big cloud). Had to scoot up and talk him through the recovery back into VMC. Said he didn’t even consider doing a 180 when it looked bad up ahead. A 180 should always be Plan B, unless you can spontaneously come up with a better one.
Some people speculate that the Kobe pilot was trying to please. If so, then bad pilot, dead pilot, dead Kobe and others. Failure in logic. Couple of high-timers just did this the other day. Flew into the top of a hill on approach in PA. Possibly forget to adjust the altimeter. Definitely forgot to do something. One was a CFI. And they were IMC to VFR. If you don’t know or trust or manage your instruments, stay out of the soup! Safely land and have something to eat. Forget about getting there. It will happen later. Plan for it. Enjoy it as a little game with nature. The heavies do it all the time.
Bottom line is lack of comprehension, both in the instructing and learning.
Same reason a college grad today can’t make change at McDonald’s without a computer cash register to indicate the change amount, and still can’t count it out starting with the sale amount.
Apparently the FAA is starting to question CFI abilities.
And if someone can’t pull something off while ” not current”, they weren’t very good at it when they were current. See opening statement.
The advent of Technically Advanced Aircraft, the glass cockpit, will contribute to these sorts of accidents. As pilots believe the data presented will allow them to ‘fly around’ or ‘pick through’ the weather, because they’ll have live displays in the cockpit. Enough of them will be successful doing this, that it will become somewhat prevalent.
We’re a culture of immediate satisfaction. Having to wait, or God Forbid, say no, is not really acceptable anymore. Patients is virtue, but an uncommon one.
One other thing, as a last resort, a safe landing off-airport on some field or another, is a much better outcome than the usual continued VFR-Into-IMC. We just never actually train for that as an option. Most light aircraft can land on grass, no problem, and with the right training and technique, the risk is far less than IIMC and the loss of control into terrain that follows.
In my years as FBO I was convinced that in many cases the pilot saw no viable options offered.
A ride to the motel, loan of a car, or even the offer of a qualified CFII to fly the airplane to VFR conditions for an hourly rate and transportation home was made available, the pilot had choices.
Too often someone stood looking out the window as the ill fated airplane was loading and said something like “he’s going to kill himself” but failed to walk out and offer any alternatives. I had a number of those “wing tip” discussions with mixed results over the year. If we really want to reduce these accidents, then WE should choose to get involved before the fact. Just my humble opinion.
JH
Never rely on a weather forecast. If the weather in route or at your destination is below your minimums assume it will be the same when you arrive, and have a solid plan B at departure time.
Kobe Bryant – I’m not a Helo pilot – but in my fixed wing mentality – I am wondering – is there any reason why the Helo pilot couldn’t pull into a hover prior to entering IMC and wait till he obtained clearance to approach and land ?
There was no “technical” reason that the pilot could not have landed, even in a field or wide spot along the highway. The point of the story however is the pilot’s fixation on “getting there” precluded all other decision making until too late.
Also of note, I believe I read that neither the pilot was not helo-instrument current or qualified.
I think that is false (not Instrument rated or current). I understand that he was instrument qualified. I understand why he did not file (he would have been vectored such that it would have taken a different route and more time).
What I do not understand is knowing that the ceiling was closing, why he did not slow so that he could hover and make a decision on what to do next. I am told that to hover, one has to have ground reference because the A/P can’t hover since it doesn’t know, nor can tell, if it is drifting in any direction.
But I’m not a rotor wing pilot, I can only go by what I was told relative to rotor wing ops and issues with them for A/P and hovering.
The pilot hovered near Van Nuys airport before launching into the low clouds.
He could have landed there and had Bryant in a cab or limo for the 25 minute ride to Camarillo.
I flew out of Camarillo for years, and the ‘morning and evening low clouds and fog’ are common nearly all year, being a few miles from the coast.
Couple of points to ponder:
This was not inadvertent IMC, the PIC chose to climb after apparently running out of all other options. He was a CFII, but not current and the 135 operating certificate was VFR only.
The Sikorsky S-76 was designed to operate off a hard surface (helipad/airport). The landing gear is retractable and quite small for unprepared surfaces.
Also the glare shield is very high and the nose is long limiting forward vision at slow speed, not a good helicopter for scud running.
There are so many things wrong with this whole accident and not enough space to comment on it.
I have to wonder why did the PIC pass up so many opportunities to land at an airport and break the chain of events that led up to the accident? We can only speculate…..