This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.
I am a student pilot who was doing solo touch-and-go landings. On my fourth lap in the pattern, I lost control of the Cessna 172 after touching down, departed the runway, and struck a taxi sign.
I had been out of the cockpit for about two weeks.
My final approach was slightly steeper than usual, but I was maintaining my airspeed between 70-75 knots while flying to the numbers, so I decided to continue the approach.
As expected, the round-out and flare portion of the landing were longer than usual.
In ground effect, the aircraft drifted to the right of the centerline. I corrected this by pointing the nose of the aircraft slightly to the left in order to intercept the runway centerline.
As my airspeed slowed past 40, I made contact with the runway and bounced back up into the air. Since a single bounce was not uncommon, my intent at this point was still to continue with the touch-and-go landing. I did one additional bounce as the airplane started coming back towards the runway centerline.
I finally lost confidence in the landing and decided to go around. I do not recall precisely the airspeed, but it must have been around 35-40. I began the procedure to wave-off, and I applied full power.
By now, the aircraft had settled to the surface and was rolling down the runway. After I increased the throttle to max, I became confused about the next steps to take because I was mentally prepared to execute the touch-and-go, and the actions I was prepared to take were to raise the flaps, turn the carb heat off, and takeoff normally.
Since the airplane was simply rolling down the runway at this point, I began to do the tasks associated with cleaning up the airplane for a takeoff. I knew that the aircraft would not be able to accelerate well with the flaps in the landing configuration, so I reached over and began to raise the flaps. I also needed to turn the carb heat off.
But I was unfamiliar with the flap selector switch on this aircraft, since it was a spring-loaded switch. When I took my hand off of it to turn the carb heat off, the flaps stopped moving. I returned my hand to the flap selector again to raise the flaps and looked around to verify the physical position of the flaps.
Throughout this entire time, I had been rolling from the right side of the runway back towards the centerline. Also, due to being at full power, the left-turning tendency of the airplane caused it to veer to the left.
Since I was fixated on the flaps and preoccupied with the switches in the cockpit and checking the flap position, I did not immediately notice the change in the airplane’s direction.
When I looked ahead again, I had only had a few hundred feet remaining before departing off the left side of the runway.
At this point, I remember feeling confused because I was halfway through the procedures for a touch-and-go and halfway through the procedures for a go around. I was not completely confident in the ability to rotate and take off because the flaps were still partially retracted and I was unsure of the airspeed that I had.
I knew for certain that I wanted to avoid any possibility of a low-level stall, so I wanted to abort the takeoff.
I took out the power and applied right rudder and braking in attempt to stay on the hard surface, but did not do so aggressively enough to make a meaningful change in direction.
I briefly considered applying even more right rudder and right brake pressures, but I am unfamiliar with the ground handling characteristics at high speed and did not want to risk tipping over the airplane and causing a wingtip strike.
I believed that the best course of action was to slow down straight ahead. My first reaction was to apply full braking, but I ended up skidding and suddenly veering further left, directly towards the taxi sign.
After knocking down the sign, I braked and came to a stop in the grass between the taxiway and runway. Then, I immediately proceeded with the emergency engine shutdown checklist.
Primary Problem: Human Factors
ACN: 1838501
Hard lesson…
Love the comments from the pilots that never screw up. Must be nice to go right to Top Gun pilot bypassing student.
Pretty detailed recall for someone who was “feeling confused”….
Student inadequately vetted before solo endorsement.
Should have been through loss of power at rotational speed practice. Chop power completely whilst holding the stick back thus causing the aircraft to use its drag and come to a halt. Brakes not often needed.
Ian Saville.