This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.
I was the Part 141 check pilot administering a commercial pilot stage check for a student in the university flight program. The flight started off well, with the student performing as desired.
After several maneuvers, I could sense the student was getting stressed, and the maneuver quality started to diminish.
We were at the half-way point on the stage check, and were going to do short and soft field takeoffs and landings at ZZZ. The student entered the pattern correctly, was the appropriate distance in downwind, base and final. Upon rolling out on final, I noticed the speed was showing 80 kts. It should be closer to 70 kts, with the intent and energy of slowing to 61 kts by short final.
I was hoping the student would elect to go around, as is allowed in the CPL ACS, but the student decided to continue the approach. It resulted in an unstable final, with improper control inputs to achieve the desired state.
The result was forcing a landing onto the runway, landing flat and 400 feet long.
After touchdown, the student stood on the brakes for max braking, but locked up the left main, and we heard the hiss from the tire being blown, followed by the airplane pulling to the left.
We came to a stop about 1,600 feet down the runway and then shut the airplane down while still on the runway.
After deplaning and inspecting the tire, we decided it was best to tow the airplane to the ramp with the left main gear on a dolly.
With no maintenance personnel at the airfield, the student and I worked together to tow the aircraft safely back to the ramp.
Once the tire and brake assembly were replaced, and maintenance was satisfied, we performed a brake check with the mechanic nearby. All was successful, so we departed to the home airport without further incident.
I gave the student the option of flying back or letting me fly. The decision was made that I would fly back, with the student on the radios.
To prevent this from occurring in the future, I could end the flight earlier if it isn’t going well, and also try to make the student feel less stressed in an already stressful environment.
Some factors that I’m sure played a part were the following:
- End of a semester (pressure to complete the course after delays for maintenance and weather that cancelled earlier flights),
- No local housing — student had a two-hour drive to the airport, and
- It was one of the warmest days of the year with more updrafts than previously flown in while performing the commercial maneuvers.
A risk assessment was completed prior to the flight, but that doesn’t mean that the flight was risk-free.
As pilots gain experience, they start to make better decisions. We as instructors need to foster that decision making process early in their flying career.
An instructor with 20 years experience will have a different outlook than one with two years experience. Seasoned instructors have a responsibility to mentor new instructors when it comes to the decision making process. Unfortunately, sometimes experience is the best teacher. Good judgment comes from experience, but experience comes from bad judgment.
Primary Problem: Aircraft
ACN: 1899587
Shocked that a commercial applicant would make such primary student mistakes. Something big is missing in his training and that i think is probably the fault of the training and certification system. I’m a 20-plus year cfi and ii and I’ve flown with a number of aircraft owners on flight reviews whose basic skill and knowledge levels are lacking.
To the author: The narrative was not provided by the pilot, but by the evaluation certified flight instructor.
Hmmm roll-out was ~down the RW… but only LH tire blew-out [failed? pressure/heat-vent plug ‘blew-out?]… and the LH brake was also ‘damaged/replaced’?
Odd. I would have expected the RH tire/wheel/brake to show definite signs of ‘stress’… and required detailed inspections, at VERY LEAST.
Hmmmm almost seems like the LH tire/wheel may have had a fault, IE: leaking/low-pressure… or maybe… there was a ‘pull to the right’ and the SP [unconsciously] applied too much LH braking to counteract.
Hopefully the mechanic… called to ‘work this problem on-site… would troubleshoot the RH tire/wheel/brake… ‘just because’. Would be useful to hear the mechanic’s assessment.
A 141 stage check should closely simulate a checkride; otherwise you are not going to know whether the student is ready for the checkride.
The primary problem wasn’t the aircraft. It was poor flying by the student and poor monitering of the student. While this may be a learning experience for the student, they will need watching to see if they make similar mistakes when stressed.
I’m a bit confused by the CFI’s summary/analysis:
“As pilots gain experience, they start to make better decisions…..
An instructor with 20 years experience will have a different outlook than one with two years experience. Seasoned instructors have a responsibility to mentor new instructors when it comes to the decision making process.”
I absolutely agree; but this Part 141 check pilot is an ATP/CFI with over 4000 hours. What’s their excuse?
😂😂😜😜🤨🤨