When I read the NTSB accident and ASRS incident reports we publish I often come to the end and think, “That sucks.”
Some combination of bad luck, poor decision-making, equipment failure, and a lack of knowledge or proficiency conspire to create a situation that we read about from the safety of our chosen device.
But at the conclusion of a few of the reports I defiantly shake my head and say out loud “NO!”
In one example, on a very hot day, the pilot elected to preflight the plane inside the air-conditioned hangar prior to pulling his Cessna 182 into the hot sun.
“Upon completion of my preflight, I went to retrieve my bag and briefcase while my son opened the hangar door and moved the airplane to the end of our taxiway. I walked out to the airplane and put the gear in the backseat.”
And with that this pilot in command takes off with the tow bar still attached to the nosewheel.
“Everything was normal as I passed V1 and began to lift the nose. At that point I heard a loud bang and vibration. I assumed I had hit an obstruction.”
While the pilot was able to control the airplane, he started troubleshooting. He also called his son.
“I was able to get my son on the telephone who told me the nosewheel had been severed from the airplane. Apparently, he had not removed the tow bar when he moved the airplane from the hangar and when I rotated it jammed into the turf, resulting in the failure.”
As a reminder, FAR Part 91.3 is titled “Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.” Part (a) states: “The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority, as to the operation of that aircraft.”
The pilot in command was able to successfully execute an emergency landing at another airport.
Upon reflection, the pilot in command admits, “The incident could have been avoided with a simple, final walk around the aircraft after having ‘ground personnel’ (my son) move the airplane out of the hangar.”
You know, actually being pilot in command.
Another example comes when a pilot in command hears one thing, but thinks something else, which leads to a near collision.
“The 310 announced downwind for Runway YY, but in my mind I was thinking XX since everyone else was using that runway.”
A look at the pilot in command’s traffic display showed the “310 looking like it was on downwind for XX (when actually he was on base for YY).”
After seeing no traffic on base or final for XX, this pilot in command took off from XX.
That was close enough for the 310 pilot in command to declare a go-around.
To which this pilot in command states, “Had he just landed, I would have flown over him.”
Not knowing the orientation of the runways or how close the two aircraft came to one another makes it difficult to ascertain the true danger of this one-sided narrative.
What’s most troubling, for me, is the closing sentence.
“ZZZ has become so busy, a tower would have prevented this near miss from happening.”
This pilot in command’s assumption led to a near collision. He barely finished that thought before making yet another erroneous assumption.
While ATC is staffed with amazing people, they are still people. And all people are prone to mistakes.
Remember, our title includes three words: pilot in command. Best not to forget those last two.
Some ATC guys feel that we are there for them.
Nope.
Regarding the unremoved tow bar, the old expression comes to mind: “Trust but verify.” Relying on other people can lead to disaster in critical situations. Better to put your eyes on the airplane before takeoff, regardless of what your son or daughter or buddy might say. “The life you save might be yours.”
Regards/J
I requested an intersection departure at night at XXX airport. I was cleared for takeoff at the intersection and advised there was an airplane on a two mile final behind me. I rolled out onto the runway and momentarily stopped on the centerline to cross check my compass, making a slight adjustment. The moment I began to apply power the tower called and told me to immediately takeoff or clear the runway. Since I had already begun the ground roll and the intersection was behind me I continued the takeoff. As I was climbing out the tower operator began to rant at me for delaying my takeoff once I was cleared. He was expecting a response from me but since I was in a critical phase of flight at night I ignored his rant. This made him even more upset. I departed his airspace but upon arriving at my destination XXX approach control gave me a number to call when I landed. I called the tower operator by where I had to hear his rant once again. According to the operator I had failed to maintain two-way radio communication inside his airspace. He said he was going to file a violation. I told him go right ahead but to be sure to save the tapes. Since all he did was rant, I saw no reason to respond. However, if he had issued a clearance changing my departure course or given me an altitude limit I would have responded accordingly. But most importantly, I made it very clear that I was pilot in command, and that I had the “responsibility and final authority, as to the operation of the aircraft”. I had every right to delay the departure if I determined it was not safe to do so. One can never be to too cautious making a night departure. And arguing on the radio during a critical phase of flight is not appropriate. I never heard anything more about the issue.