This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.
After flying for a little under an hour, my instructor realized our fuel was burning unevenly from both tanks (more from the left than the right). To correct, we decided to switch tanks to just the right tank rather than “Both.”
I can’t remember how long it was after switching tanks, but I remember hearing the engine die off and the throttle having no response. I told my instructor that we lost all engine power, pitched to slow down for best glide but not stall, and the instructor took the controls.
After trying to gather myself, I asked if we should request priority handling. Instructor said yes, as I assumed, and I took the comms while the instructor flew and I requested priority handling with complete loss of engine power.
After troubleshooting for 30 seconds to a minute, we realized the fuel selector switch was stuck and never became fully engaged to the right tank selection. We switched the fuel back to both to be safe just in case there was, in fact, an issue with switching the fuel selector switch to the right tank, and the engine restarted due to wind milling of the prop.
After this, since we already requested, we headed back to ZZZ and landed without issue.
Over the past year or so I have been on and off of training after taking an over year long break from flying. Because of this, I not only lost proficiency but lost knowledge I used to retain.
I had studied religiously for my commercial maneuvers, but taking for granted that the plane would fly without hiccups.
I thought I knew my procedures like the back of my hand, but in the moment I did not. Fuel should have been the first thing I checked. I blanked in the moment, and I should have instantly thought of the fact that I recently switched tanks, and the engine must have starved of fuel somehow. I should have instantly looked down at the selector switch to indicate the obvious issue and acted on that. If I knew the procedure off of the top of my head, or instantly grabbed the checklist, the issue could have been resolved in a matter of seconds before having to request. I could have prevented the issue completely if I had verified the selector switch was fully engaged visually from the start.
I plan on taking a step back and evaluating my knowledge of all procedures. My CFI and I will be going over procedures together and individually.
I believe I became complacent, trusting nothing will go wrong. I need to be proactive and preventative rather than reactive. I need to take procedures and training more serious because they can and will happen to anyone, myself included.
I do not want to hesitate to request priority handling in the future if needed, but I also need to know my procedures, checklists, and flows before getting into an aircraft as Pilot in Command (PIC) to prevent having to do so.
I should not have had to rely on my instructor to take controls. I should have known how to solve the issue immediately, or at least known the correct list to follow. I hesitated because of my lack of confidence, knowledge, and proficiency.
I will talk with not only my current instructor, but recent and other instructors I know of for advice. I want and need to become as proficient and knowledgeable of the aircraft and procedures surrounding it.
I wish to learn from my mistake(s) and prevent it from happening in the future, as well as being more than prepared for other possibilities whenever I get into an aircraft.
Primary Problem: Aircraft
ACN: 1952364
My days of flying in the 80s I would be in a number of different airplanes in a weeks time.i would for example change fuel tank then look at the selector and tap a finger on it as a final check.same with other functions like gear and flaps
It kept me happy…
After punishing himself for 1 hour for his complacency, lack of proactively, slow reaction and lack of proficiency and knowledge of the procedure the pilot concludes “Primary problem: Aircraft”. Really?
About 10 miles back, on final for Tucson the engine on my Cherokee Arrow started to sputter. The Arrow had 4 tanks, with a selector for all four. On that plane you had to level it by alternating the fuel tank selected as you progressed on a long flight. If all tanks were hooked together there would be cross flow and you wouldn’t know where your load or your fuel available were. I forgot to watch, and drained one tank empty. I nearly smashed my elbow while diving after that fuel selector!
I equally applaud the honesty …. Which is a reminder to me to review my procedures knowledge.
Thinking that “nothing will go wrong and off we go” can become embedded …. Something I am guilty of, and having read this provides a stark wake up.
A good article and honesty, thank you for the wake up.
I salute the pilot for his honest and hard self-examination of his reactions and capabilities as a pilot.
However, I’m also aghast at how simple and primitive GA aircraft hardware is in this age of iphones and space exploration. We read stories day-after-day about little airplanes suffering collapsed nose wheel assemblies, problems with fuel tank selection; failure to manually engage carb heating, etc., etc. It reminds me of stories from my grandparents of attempting to drive cross-country in the 1930s in early cars with thin tires, terrible mechanical brake systems, leaky radiators that needed added rice to stop leaks, traveling often over dirt and rutted roads decades prior to the Interstate system. The engineer in me is perplexed that any switching valve mechanism is needed to meter fuel to the engine. Why isn’t it always ‘both’ with no option? Wouldn’t simultaneous tank draining maintain the axial balance of the plane? Why manual selection to distract the pilot? Same goes for manual application of carb heating. These flying machines are the Ford Model-Ts of the air; crystal sets in an HD digital world. It’s no wonder there are so many crashes and deaths in these primitive machines.
Regards/J
As the writer noted, and sometimes happens for various reasons, the fuel doesn’t burn evenly from each tank when on both. So not having the option to select a tank to control lateral balance would be undesirable.
I’m with you, James. Way back in the 1940s the Ercoupe fuel system was designed to feed automatically from both tanks, and the fuel selector knob only needed On and Off settings. It worked just fine. Given how many times we read on this site about fuel starvation incidents in which there is plenty of fuel aboard, I have to conclude that GA aircraft fuel systems are needlessly complicated, and that complication is causing accidents.
An engine out is an emergency, why are pilots so afraid to declare it?
Yep…it’s hard to criticize a successful outcome, but…
“I requested priority handling with complete loss of engine power.”
I wonder what that radio call sounded like???
I’ve learned that if I make a change – any change and something unexpected happens – I immediately undo what I just did. Things have always gone back to normal. Then I don’t attempt to do that “thing” again, until I’m on the ground.
If fuel in the wing tanks isn’t feeding equally the cause is usually an untrimmed rudder. Just like the ball the fuel shifts to the side OR
There is a blockage in a tank vent.
Good job, and safe flying..
Consider yourself fortunate. If and when this happens again, you most likely will immediately know how to react. It’s the kind of training money can’t buy.
Amen ^
Training needs to be broken down just like the military. Well, the US Marine Corps at least. (Rest do 4 focus)
The human brain can at most do 3 things at once with any degree of reliability we are built to solve problems as they appear. Ala strategy and tactics.. Two, implicit and explicit knowledge are not called tacit knowledge for a reason.
Period.