This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.
I was preparing to fly my PA-28 Cherokee to ZZZ with intentions of bringing the plane in for annual service to a shop on the field. I performed a preflight briefing using Foreflight and then a physical checkout of the plane. I reviewed the preflight checklist for completion which includes “free and clear” of the controls.
After a normal takeoff, I turned to the southwest and continued to climb. At about 1,200-1,300 feet, I noticed the elevator controls were resisting my inputs to climb and saw the airspeed reading 23 knots. I knew this was wrong because the plane was flying normally.
I considered returning to ZZZ1, but decided against it since there are homes close to the end of Runway XX. Since I was able to continue a climb, I thought it prudent to attempt to resolve the problem or get the plane to an airport with repair or emergency services if needed.
I looked at the Garmin GFC 500 autopilot to see if it was on, but it was indicating off. I turned the flight director and autopilot on and then off but there was no change in the flight controls. I was suspicious ESP (Electronic Stability Protection) was engaged but did not hear any aural alerts or see any error “X” out messages on the G3X Touch. I considered pulling the autopilot fuses but decided to “do no harm.”
I was able to maintain altitude by keeping pressure on the elevator controls so I continued the flight. I listened to ATIS at ZZZ, received information, and then called the Tower. I reported the airspeed reading of 23 knots and that I had no elevator control which was not entirely correct. I wish I had taken time to give a better explanation of the elevator resistance to climb.
Tower asked if I wanted to request priority handling and told Tower I did. I recall Tower asked where I was and requested ident. I performed the ident but I was somewhat flustered at the moment and told Tower I was north. Tower told me I was south of the field and I recall making a comment to Tower their stated location was correct. I could see I was nearing ZZZ3 airspace and flew further to the southwest to avoid conflict. Tower asked if I wanted to land at ZZZ3 and I recall telling Tower about preferring to come to ZZZ because my shop was there and the controls continued to operate in a predictable manner. Tower asked if I could see the airport and I stated I could. I heard ZZZ coordinate traffic for my arrival.
In approaching ZZZ, I was able to descend on a normal VFR approach using the PAPI. I was confident in my estimates of airspeed based on my experience in this plane and using visual clues. As I descended, I heard the aural alert indicating 500 AGL. Shortly thereafter I heard a clunk and I could feel that the flight controls were back to normal. I proceeded to land normally.
Tower asked where I wanted to go, and I replied I wanted to go to the south ramp which is where my maintenance shop is located. As I taxied to the ramp I gave the firetrucks a thumbs up and they moved aside and allowed me to proceed to the aircraft maintenance shop.
I was met at the maintenance shop by owner/IA and he spent the remainder of the business day verifying there were no flight control issues. At this point everyone involved was convinced this incident was caused by automatic activation of ESP.
A few days later I returned to the avionics shop and spoke to the owner/IA and his technical staff about the incident. The avionics shop wanted the plane immediately after the annual inspection.
That same day the avionics shop called me to report they had discovered a defective plastic fitting in the pitot static system. The barbed fitting was out of round and was of an uneven thickness that led to the fracture.
I also discussed the communication of the incident with my CFII who presented a couple possible alternate scenarios. He agreed with my decision to make a report.
This report is my recollection of the events with the intent of being a cooperative and safe pilot. Thank you.
Primary Problem: Aircraft
ACN: 1948287
The more systems on an aircraft the more learning the pilot needs! It’s best to know your systems, know your failure modes, if possible, know your responses to those failure modes. This will make sure that those failures never happen, 🙂 It is only the unknown failure modes that become issues.
One more instance of the tower controllers being professional and assisting with a problem solution. These folks are the best. I have flown in Mexico, middle America and South America, and Saudi Arabia and NONE of their controllers measure up to the guys we have in the USA. I suspect that may be that the training required by the FAA is more pilot oriented than that required by ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) which oversees the rest of countries. My experience has been that the Canadian controllers are usually very good also. In this country we seem to have developed a love/hate relationship with parts of the FAA. but in my opinion they usually do a great job.
Similar situation – new ASI installed, went out to fly. Engine roaring merrily along, trees beside the runway moving faster and faster, starting to get control authority, airspeed firmly on zero. Pull throttle, taxi back to hangar. FBO which did the work had the hoses reversed. That’s the last time I let them touch my airplane.
Also, don’t dump on the guy who reported his (similar) issue. Every emergency is different, and we don’t know how WE will handle it until it occurs. You can’t say he did it wrong because he got back on the ground unhurt and with no damage to the airplane or anything else. The fact that someone else might have done it differently doesn’t say he was wrong. Whatever works is the right answer.
I was taught that on takeoff, I make sure that the engine is making full static power.
The very next thing is to note that the airspeed is ‘alive’, in my Cessna’s case , that’s greater than 45 mph.
If either of these don’t meet the criteria, I pull the power and taxi off the runway to trouble shoot.
Yes, if the airspeed did not reach rotate speed there should have been an abort then if not at airspeed alive. The “do no harm” expression does not apply here as you were trying to resolve harm from a defective pitot input. The low airspeed obviously triggered the protection system so the breaker to the autopilot should have been pulled. Throughout this report there is a bias of getthereitis to get to his shop. How about get the plane down and pay to get the mechanic to the airplane.
He was at pattern altitude so a simple return to the field,, pull the AP breaker while on the ground, confirm controls are free and correct then a normal flight to the shop with no AP would have occurred. No fire trucks, no re-routing of traffic, no stress on the controller. Gethereitis bites yet again.
Agree. The development of that situation was due to an undoubtedly bias of getthereitis.