
The pilot bought the Piper PA-28-140 on Nov. 30, 2021. The airplane arrived at West Houston Airport (KIWS) in Texas on Dec. 3. It was filled with about 40 gallons of 100LL avgas on Dec. 4. The pilot flew the airplane for about 20 minutes on Dec. 5, then again for the accident flight on Dec. 8.
Radar and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that the airplane departed KIWS and proceeded generally south-southwest. About 1.5 miles later, the track showed a slight descending left turn and the airplane’s groundspeed increased, after which the airplane entered a slightly tighter climbing right turn during which the groundspeed decreased.
About 2.5 miles southwest of the departure end of the runway, the airplane made a tight left descending turn toward the northeast, followed immediately by a hard right descending turn back to the southwest. The airplane’s descent rate continued to increase until radar contact was lost about 700 feet above the ground. There were no witnesses to the accident, which was fatal to both the student pilot and a passenger.
According to the student pilot’s flight instructor, he had been receiving flight training for about a year. He had about 38 hours of flight experience, all of which was in a Cessna 172. The pilot had completed all solo requirements and had four hours of night flight experience toward his private pilot certificate, but had not completed all of the required training in flight solely by reference to the instruments.
National Weather Service Surface Analysis Charts for the time of the accident depicted a stationary warm front over Texas with a high-pressure ridge extending over the area. Warm, moist, southeasterly wind advection from the Gulf of Mexico inland supported the development of low stratiform clouds and fog. The station models on the charts depicted overcast clouds and fog/mist expanding over the Texas gulf coast. They also extended northwestward and inland over the surrounding area with temperature-dew point spreads of 4°F or less.
The 12-hour Low-Level Significant Weather Prognostic Chart indicated an extensive area of instrument flight rules (IFR) and marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions expected to develop along the Texas gulf coast. While KIWS did not have a weather reporting station, observations from nearby airports indicated prevailing IFR conditions due to low ceilings and visibility restricted in mist.
There was no record of the pilot receiving a preflight weather briefing from a flight service provider or through Foreflight. According to the pilot’s flight instructor, the pilot was familiar with obtaining preflight weather, interpreting METARs, TAFs, and AIRMETs, and basic weather minimums.
Before the accident, the pilot reached out to the flight instructor twice about flight training in the Piper, however the instructor never saw the airplane. He was unaware if the pilot was receiving instruction from any other flight instructors.
The plane crashed in a wooded area about 2.5 miles southwest of the departure end of the runway. The debris path was about 50 feet long on a heading of 320°
The first identified point of impact were two trees. About 10 feet past the trees was the first piece of debris — a fragment of outboard right wing that remained wrapped around a tree.
Continuing along the debris path was a narrow series of cut trees. Each one was topped slightly closer to the ground, descending toward a large impact crater in the soft dirt. Scattered around the base of these trees were various fragments of the right wing, the main landing gear, and the vertical stabilizer with rudder attached.
The impact crater was about 2.5 feet deep by 5 feet long. Located inside of the crater were the propeller assembly, the starter ring gear, a spark plug fragment, and other engine fragments. Portions of engine cowling, right side door, and various instruments/radios were in the vicinity around the crater.
The main wreckage came to rest just beyond the impact crater and comprised all major components of the airplane. The airplane came to rest nose-low with the tail extended upward at an angle. The engine was completely separated from the airplane and came to rest near the empennage. The firewall, instrument panel, and cabin sustained extensive damage.
On-scene examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation, according to investigators.
The left wing remained attached at the wing spar and was fractured about mid span. The fuel cap remained secured; however, the fuel tank was breached and no fuel was noted. The outboard left wing leading edge exhibited extensive aft crushing. The right wing was fractured into several pieces; two larger pieces exhibited a circular tree indent along with aft crush damage. The inboard right wing came to rest near the fuselage. The fuel cap remained secured, and the fuel tank was breached.
The aft fuselage sustained downward accordion crushing. It also displayed a large circular indentation consistent with tree contact. The stabilator remained secured to its attachment points. The vertical stabilizer and rudder were fracture-separated and a large circular tree impact was noted on the side. The flight control system exhibited extensive damage, but all cables/chains remained attached at their respective surfaces and all cable fractures were consistent with overload.
There were no visual indications of catastrophic engine failure. The propeller assembly was fracture separated and the crankshaft flange was bent. The No. 1 cylinder head was fractured; the push rods and upper spark plug were fracture separated.
The remaining upper spark plugs were removed and consistent with normal operation. The magnetos remained attached to their mounting pads; the right magneto sustained impact damage and would not rotate. The left magneto remained intact and was removed; spark was obtained on all points. Borescope examination of the piston heads, cylinder walls, valves, and lower spark plugs were all consistent with normal operation. The engine was rotated by hand; drivetrain continuity was established, and thumb compression was obtained on all four cylinders.
The airplane maintenance logbooks were not recovered.
Probable Cause: The student pilot’s decision to depart into night instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a loss of airplane control
To download the final report. Click here. This will trigger a PDF download to your device.
This December 2021 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
Who can forget “178 Seconds to Live”? Sadly for these two, looks like that was a fairly accurate estimate. RIP.
My home airport. I was there when the deputies gave the news to the waiting girlfriend and the pilot’s family. I will never forget the anguished wails. A CFI friend of mine had landed that evening just before dark in 900 foot ceilings. So sad. So preventable.
Howdy Pat;
Witnessing that moment is a life-changing event for anyone who has experienced it. Maybe if some of my fellow “commenters” had, they’d re-think their vitriolic remarks.
I’ve got fond memories of KIWS; site of my…our…first-ever Air Safety Institute seminar presentation! The industrial fans in that very warm hangar were so loud, folks couldn’t hear me and half of them left at the break…
Anyway…looking forward to more Mad Props Aero podcasts!
Tom C.
No surprise! Student, night IFR…..What could go wrong….
Can’t fix stupid! For those that want to stay alive you need 3000’ ceilings and 5 mile’s visibility day time. No night unless your current IFR rated. USA is the only country that allows VFR night. Even high time pilots loose it in IFR conditions, it amazes me how some think with a couple hours under the hood that they can fly IFR. ALWAYS AMAZING THE DAY AFTER THE ACCIDENT THE WEATHER IS BEAUTIFUL! There really is no reason for anyone dying in Aviation. Truly safe if you just follow the rules. Here is your stupid sign!
More stupid Pilot tricks that raise insurance rates for the rest of us.
Apart from this pilot’s stupid decisions, as a student pilot, why was a passenger carried aboard?
Anti-authority, macho, resignation, invisibility attitudes here. Nothing new, just look at driving behavior: speeding, failure to obey signals and road markings plus road rage. Probably going to get worse and will continue.