This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.
I just departed Runway 1 at Middlebury State Airport (6B0) in Vermont, making a left midfield downwind departure to the south in my Aircraft X, and I made a call on CTAF stating precisely that.
Immediately after my CTAF call, conflicting Aircraft Y made a call on CTAF stating something to the effect that he was “from the south at 4,500 MSL, would be overhead the airport at traffic pattern altitude.”
I thought that seemed aggressive considering his proximity (very near) to the airport, and it would require him to make a very high rate of descent.
I noticed on my TCAD/ADS-B that we had conflicting courses (his target showed a direction vector) and that he was descending, so I stopped my climb at 3,300 MSL.
He continued his descent and direction into me. He was never making any effort to deconflict, despite the apparent conflict on our ADS-Bs (he was ADS-equipped).
I made another call on CTAF, querying what he was doing.
He was showing that he was at my 1 to 2 o’clock position, with no visual separation; because of this, I couldn’t turn right to deconflict (exacerbate the problem) and could not descend as he was descending AND verbally indicated that he was trying to get to pattern altitude (1,500 feet MSL). I also couldn’t turn left because of the terrain (mountains).
The pilot of Aircraft Y did nothing to deconflict from a very near collision. Instead, he aggravated this dangerous situation with both erroneous CTAF calls and his incorrect entry into the airport environment.
This pilot, in my opinion, should be immediately re-examined on his knowledge of traffic deconflictions and uncontrolled airport traffic patterns. Based on this incident, it is clear that he is a liability to others and himself.
Primary Problem: Procedure
ACN: 2032084
AC90-66c non-towered patterns
Yeah, I learned departures from the downwind decades ago, too. Sometimes things change for the better. This is one of them.
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1041885
The suggested arrival & departure procedures are illustrated in Appendix A. The preferred procedure is:
+Downwind is for aircraft already in the pattern & aircraft arriving on the 45 at pattern altitude.
+Departures are straight ahead or a turn in the pattern direction (l or r) toward crosswind & then 45 between runway heading & crosswind heading until 500 ft above pattern altitude. Then continue on course.
+notice that straight out downwind departures have been eliminated, too. The downwind side is for arrivals & t&gs only. The departure end is for departures only.
Well said. Departing from the downwind is wrong.
Pilot X flew into the traffic pattern for approaching traffic and is complaining ?
How can one complain about non standard procedures while executing non standard procedures? The system works best when everyone does their best to comply with best practices.
First, read about operations at a non-towered airport in your AIM. Then’ the next time you depart from 6B0 on runway 1 with the intent of leaving the local area to the south, follow the recommended procedure. That is to depart the upwind leg,after you reach about 800′ AGL, make a left turn to heading 335 degrees, and continue your climb on that heading to at least 500′ above the traffic pattern before you head south.
Do not ever plan on potentially conflicting traffic to follow any predictable procedure. The terrain at 6B0 is a factor which causes arrivals to do strange and unpredictable things!
It was a ‘fight or flight’ scenario in which the offending pilot was an inconsiderate actor. Best way to deal with a bully is to beat it out of there before things get brutal. Then report him to the authorities for ‘corrective action.’
Regards/J
If you fly long enough you will experience something like this, so be prepared to take whatever evasive action is necessary. Neither traffic pattern standards nor radio communication are required by regulation in that airspace (only advisory). Even if it were required by regulation, an event such as this would be difficult to prosecute (the FAA only makes regulations that are considered “enforceable”). The reporting pilot apparently had ADS-B (also not required here) which is fortunate for him/her. Stay safe my friends.
I don’t ever recall “very near” to be an accurate way of determining position. A 3,000 foot descent at 3 miles would be very different to the same descent at 10. If it was a high wing/low wing scenario, that surely increases the worry factor, but with scant details, who is to say the problem? If the two pilots had a dialogue, it was not particularly effective.