Lessons learned from a near miss

This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.

Flying to Los Lunas, NM (E98), I was entering from the northwest into the flight training area that is about 10 to 15 miles west of Double Eagle airport (KAEG). My flight level was around 10,000 feet msl with a slight descent (~200-300 ft/min) on a long approach to E98 about 30 nm away.

I could see on the EFB, via ADS-B In, that there was a high volume of aircraft traffic west of KAEG and southeast of me.

Two aircraft were soon to become in conflict with my direction of flight.

The first aircraft began to converge from the 9 o’clock position on a 30° angle. I was unable to visually spot the aircraft and, although it was below my flight altitude, I turned about 15° to the left to minimize convergence and this aircraft soon no longer became a factor.

By this time, I had descended to around 9,000 feet msl and would overfly the second aircraft, which was now circling clockwise below me by ~1,000 feet.

Shortly after these two encounters, a third aircraft that was southwest of me, and not a factor as indicated on the EFB, unexpectedly turned to the east, becoming an immediate concern for possible collision. Although they were below me in altitude by ~500 feet at the time of their turning, they were apparently climbing on a converging course.

I stopped my slow descent and, though my passenger and I were looking, we were unable to visually spot them. The EFB indicated that they were still converging and by the time my passenger spotted them they were less than 100 feet below and 500 feet lateral such that they passed very close below and behind us.

This near-miss brought to my attention my lack of taking action to prevent it.

Why no action was taken once I identified convergence without visual identification is possibly due to a combination of factors: My disbelief that they had turned toward me, disbelief that another aircraft was again posing a risk, and failure to believe that the situation was as bad as it was rapidly becoming contributed to my lack of corrective action.

Also, the speed at which it went from a no-factor condition to a potential collision plus my mindset on approach to landing at E98 not far away (“get-there-itis”) contributed to a lack of corrective action.

This lack of initiating a strong corrective action could have resulted in a mid-air collision.

Although I had stopped the descent, a positive corrective action needed to be made immediately after the aircraft turned on a converging path and I was unable to see it.

An immediate greater than 700 ft/min climb would have been best. A steep turn to the left would turn back toward the KAEG area and traffic, plus would likely put me on a parallel course with the converging aircraft at nearly the same altitude and position.

Several lessons were learned by me in this encounter.

I should have obtained VFR flight following once I noticed the congestion of aircraft plus, I should be aware that “get-there-itis” will be a strong factor once I get near my landing airport.

Also, it is best to remain well outside of training areas on weekends when there is heavy traffic.

For KAEG, I now intend to stay much further west of the airport or above 10,000 feet msl when transiting the area.

Most importantly, I must be more proactive in avoidance maneuvers (climbing, turning, etc.) of any potential conflict identified via ADS-B In — especially when no visual contact has been made.

Primary Problem: Human Factors

ACN: 2049326 (88 of 100)