According to the pilot, he performed a preflight inspection of the Piper PA-32 with no anomalies noted, received a weather briefing, and departed Wabash Municipal Airport (KIWH) in Indiana, destined for Martin State Airport (KMTN) in Baltimore, Maryland, on an instrument flight rules clearance.
About two hours into the flight, the airplane was about 11,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) approaching clouds, and the pilot increased engine power and turned the pitot heat on.
The airplane was “underperforming and unable to climb over the clouds,” he told investigators.
After entering the clouds, he noticed the airspeed decreasing and the autopilot increasing the pitch of the airplane to maintain altitude. He disengaged the autopilot, decreased the pitch attitude of the airplane, and noted that it was “difficult to maintain pitch control.”
He examined the wings and windscreen for any signs of ice but saw none.
The pilot notified air traffic control of his difficulty controlling the airplane, and they declared an emergency for him. The airplane descended out of the clouds into heavy rain.
The pilot elected to perform a forced landing to a road near Grantsville, Maryland. During the landing the airplane hit trees and terrain, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage, wings, and empennage. The pilot and two passengers received minor injuries.
According to the Airplane Flight Manual and an engineering drawing, the airplane was required to have a placard on the left side of the cockpit that states, “THIS AIRCRAFT APPROVED FOR NIGHT IFR NON-ICING FLIGHT WHEN EQUIPPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAR 91 OR FAR 135.” The placard was not located in the cockpit after the accident.
Composite weather images for radar scans indicated light to moderate precipitation along the airplane’s flight path. The upper air sounding indicated that the freezing level was located at 5,100 feet MSL, and cloud conditions were expected up to 13,000 feet MSL.
The National Weather Service’s Current Icing Product (CIP) and Forecast Icing Product (FIP) are intended to supplement AIRMETs and SIGMETs. The FIPs for 9,000 feet, 10,000 feet, and 11,000 feet indicated a 40% to 85% probability of icing from 9,000 feet msl to 11,000 feet msl over the area corresponding to the weather encounter. The FIPs indicated that the icing intensity would range from “light” to “heavy.”
An AIRMET for icing conditions indicated moderate icing between the freezing level and 17,000 feet MSL.
A performance study was conducted using automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data to determine specific airplane performance characteristics. The study showed that during level flight above 10,000 feet MSL, there were increases in drag that were also present during the final descent of the airplane.
The study indicated that, at 1945, the pitch was increasing and the airspeed was decreasing, which was consistent with the pilot’s report that the autopilot was increasing the pitch to maintain altitude. Just after 1946:30, the pitch decreased, corresponding to when the pilot disconnected the autopilot and decreased the pitch attitude. The airplane began to descend 15 seconds later, and there was a marked increase in drag.
At 1947, the airplane began a turn to the right. Pitch again increased, but the descent continued while lift and drag increased. At that time, drag was four times higher than any other time in the flight.
The airplane’s calculated airspeed slowed to near 54 knots, which was below the power off, gross weight, no flaps stall speed of 57 knots. At 1948, the angle of attack, pitch, lift, and drag all decreased suddenly. This loss of lift was consistent with an aerodynamic stall. The airplane then recovered and gained airspeed while continuing to descend.
At 1951, the drag quickly increased but without an increase in lift, and the airplane began a turn to the right.
At 1951:30, the lift dropped sharply without having increased during the increase in drag. This sudden loss of lift occurred at a much lower lift coefficient and angle of attack than the previous event at 1948 and at an airspeed above 100 knots, well above the airplane’s stall speed.
The airplane recovered briefly before the drag began to increase again. The airplane was still slowing when the ADS-B data ended as the airplane descended below 150 feet above the terrain. The accident site was located about 2,500 feet beyond the last data point.
Generally, ice accumulation on an airplane’s wings increases drag and reduces the amount of lift the wing can produce. Ice accumulation on the fuselage of an airplane also increases drag. Additionally, ice accumulation on propeller blades reduces the amount of thrust that can be produced.
The pilot did not request weather information from Leidos Flight Service, however, he did request and receive a ForeFlight weather briefing at 1713 with a proposed departure time of 1725. The pilot reported that there was moderate icing forecast for the time of the flight.
Probable Cause: The pilot’s decision to continue the flight into an area of moderate to heavy icing conditions, which resulted in a degradation of airplane performance and subsequent loss of control.
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This April 2022 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
Another example of the adage. : There are old pilots, and there are bold pilots, but there are no old ,bold pilots. This guy was lucky to do something stupid and survive.
Stupid pilot tricks at work again!
I think there was an old song that applies here. “Fools rush in where Angels fear to tread”.
Hmmm. Purposely flying a non-FIKI airplane into predicted FIKI conditions—definitely a candidate for the Darwin Award.