This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.
I was arriving at Pocono Mountains Regional Airport (KMPO) in Pennsylvania via an active instrument flight plan on the RNAV13 approach from the VOKYO IAF in IMC under the control of Wilkes-Barre TRACON.
Shortly after turning onto the final approach course, ATC requested that I cancel my IFR flight plan as soon as possible because there was an aircraft waiting for a release at KMPO and he then instructed me to change to CTAF frequency.
I changed to CTAF and announced that I was on a 10-mile final for Runway 13. I announced again on CTAF that when I was on a 5-mile final. I broke out of the clouds shortly after passing the FAF, at which time I changed back to the TRACON frequency and cancelled my IFR flight plan. I changed back to CTAF and announced that I was on a 1 mile final for Runway 13. I landed.
While on my roll-out, as I was approaching the crossing Runway 05/23 (there are no taxiways at this part of the airport) I heard on CTAF “Aircraft Y departing Runway 23.”
I immediately applied my brakes with maximum effort to stop short of Runway 23. As I came to a stop less than 150 feet from Runway 05/23, the other aircraft passed in front of me on their takeoff roll, resulting in a near-miss.
I was monitoring CTAF for at least six minutes prior to landing (except for the brief change back to TRACON frequency for approximately 10-15 seconds to cancel my IFR flight plan) and heard no radio calls of any sort until the call from the other aircraft initiating their takeoff.
From my perspective there are several considerations regarding the cause of this near-miss: The other aircraft was possibly unaware that I was landing on the crossing runway, they were aware but chose to depart anyway assuming that I would land and hold short of Runway 23. Presumably, the other aircraft was impatient because of the delay in their IFR release caused by my approach. It took me 13 minutes to fly the RNAV13 approach from IAF until landing. I don’t know how long the other plane was waiting for release, but it was at least six minutes because ATC advised me of such six minutes prior to my touchdown.
Perhaps once I cancelled my IFR flight plan, release was given to the other aircraft and in haste they departed without having full situation awareness of other aircraft in the vicinity.
Also, I did not have full situational awareness of the other aircraft even though ATC told me that there was an aircraft waiting for release.
I am a fairly new instrument rated pilot and am still building confidence and awareness of the operation of the National Airspace System (NAS).
In hindsight, I should have kept my IFR flight plan open until I landed and cancelled on the ground. I felt that I was being a courteous user of the NAS by succumbing to the pressure from ATC to cancel “quickly” and cancelling as soon as I was VMC, but by doing so I allowed a situation to develop that had more risk than if I had waited and cancelled on the ground.
Going forward, I will not succumb to pressure from ATC to cancel my IFR flight plan at non-towered fields prior to landing unless I plan to fly a normal landing pattern in VMC.
The controller did NOT follow the guidance in 7110.65 4-2-10 regarding instructing pilots to cancel their IFR flight plan.
This is the second time within the last month that I felt pressure from the Wilkes-Barre TRACON to take an action that was unsafe and to which I was susceptible due to my building confidence.
Previously I hailed Wilkes-Barre clearance delivery from KMPO on 125.3 to request IFR clearance. The controller at Clearance delivery pressured me to depart VFR (even though conditions were IMC at my destination).
I called the TRACON manager the following day to discuss, but I’m starting to see a potential pattern of pushing pilots to do things that could lead to safety of flight issues to ease the workload on ATC at Wilkes-Barre TRACON.
Primary Problem: Airport
ACN: 2052652
All of us learn from our experiences. The most important lesson this pilot should have learned, or re-learned, is what he was taught early in his student training: when you’re the PIC, you make the decisions, not ATC, not other pilots. Whether ATC impliedly pressured the pilot to cancel early, he didn’t have to do that if he didn’t want to.
But in any event, any pilot making an IFR approach or departure from a non-controlled airport has to use extra vigilance to avoid conflicting traffic. It’s probably a good idea to keep ATC and CTAF up at the same time on separate radios, but I suggest that in many small GA airplanes, the #2 radio is often an older nav/com and is used more as a backup or to monitor “guard” rather than as an active part of communications, because of the flip flop button in the #1 radio, which allows using alternate frequencies on the same radio. Not only has that been my process, but as I’ve watched many other pilots handle their radios, that’s their process as well. #1 is to use; #2 is for backup or to monitor guard.
Several years ago, I was in a similar situation, only I was the one on the ground waiting for release, hoping an incoming would cancel. This was at Durango, CO, KDRO. I had taxied out listening to CTAF, then switched to Denver Center to pick up my clearance. I stayed on the Center frequency after getting it, because I had to wait for release—incoming Citation. He called, said he was 20 south, the airport in sight, so cancelling IFR. ATC immediately released me, so I switched back to CTAF, announced I was departing 21, and started rolling toward the runway. I assumed, if the Citation was 20 south, that I had at least 5 or 6 minutes to depart (180 knots is 3 nm/minute). Whether the Citation announced any other position in the pattern, I don’t know, but I didn’t look as carefully along the approach path as I should have, and as I rapidly approached the hold short line, I heard, “we’re landing here, sir!”
Was it close? Not really. But it was a lesson—don’t assume anything. Always look for any aircraft on approach. Maybe the Citation was closer than 20 south, maybe he was moving at 250 knots or even more. Lots of maybes—in my case, and in the reporting pilot’s case. So we learn.
A scary scenario: I can see why the neophyte IR pilot chose to write it up…
Understandably, the pilot makes several subjective judgments based on his/her experience. Obviously, it sounds like a no-brainer FAR Part 91.113 Right-of-Way violation. But there is way too much information and context missing to determine exactly who is guilty of what…if anything.
The report states “The controller did NOT follow the guidance in 7110.65 4-2-10 regarding instructing pilots to cancel their IFR flight plan.” Really …how so?
The pilot refers to ATC’s request to cancel IFR “as soon as possible” as “pressure”. It’d be interesting to know exactly what the controller said (and how they said it): “as soon as possible” is not the same as “quickly”.
We also don’t know what the “other” pilot knew, said, heard, saw, or ‘presumed’.
We don’t know why the other pilot, flying a light twin under Part 135, chose to start his/her takeoff roll at that time. Chances that the two pilots involved were talking to the same controller? Pretty much “zero.”
We do know that (apparently) our newby pilot was operating single-pilot IFR, in IMC, with one radio. That is just…silly, regardless.
The pilot states “I was monitoring CTAF for at least six minutes prior to landing (except for the brief change back to TRACON frequency for approximately 10-15 seconds to cancel my IFR flight plan) and heard no radio calls of any sort until the call from the other aircraft initiating their takeoff.”
In reality, all the information the pilot might have needed to build “full situational awareness” may have been transmitted during that exact “10-15 seconds”.
As far as the earlier incident where “the controller at Clearance delivery pressured me to depart VFR (even though conditions were IMC at my destination) …as being “unsafe’? Not necessarily: A pretty common practice and can be a useful option …if you choose to use it.
The predominant “lesson learned” is always controversial, but valid: Don’t cancel your IFR clearance early at a non-towered airport because you feel “pressured” by ATC to free up the airspace for other IFR traffic.
The OP comments that he changed frequencies to tracon to cancel IFR. Does that mean that only one radio was installed in the aircraft? If he has two radios, why did he not monitor CTAF on the other radio while talking to ATC???
He heard the other pilot announce departure, so he was on CTAF. Appears the main issue in this particular incident may have been that the departing aircraft had been on the ATC frequency and when he received his release and changed to CTAF, he didn’t ask the arriving pilot for his position before starting his departure.
I also learned that lesson the hard way. A couple of years ago I was flying a veteran on a Veterans Airlift Command compassionate flight. We were going to a smaller airport which was adjacent to a larger military airport in an area was unfamiliar to me. When the controller pointed out the airport I mistakenly was looking at the larger military airport and canceled my IFR flight plan.
Before I realized my error I had transitioned the protected airspace of the larger airport. When I corrected and landed at the smaller airport I got a call leading to a discussion with the FAA. Fortunately, nothing terrible, but a lesson learned. Hold that IFR flight plan as long as possible
Similar situation occurred on June 6, 2008 at North Central Airport Pawtucket, RI KSFZ, but in that case, the airplanes collided at the intersection of runways 5 and 15. Weather was 600 overcast. Accident Number NYC08LA207. https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/68183/pdf
Probable cause was “The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: Both pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other airplane. Contributing to the accident was the air traffic controllers failure to notify either pilot of the potential conflict.”
After I heard about that one, I decided I would never cancel early unless it were good day VFR conditions.
The departing pilot of course knew of your approach and impending landing. He should have communicated with you. There are no excuses for his reckless action.
Flying’s First Commandment: “Aviate, navigate, communicate.” When in doubt: fly the plane, raise the ATC issues after safely in the airport lounge sipping coffee. Sounds like ATC at Wilkes-Barre TRACON needs to go to the woodshed for a little re-education. /J