This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.
During a routine training flight with a private pilot student and myself, a flight instructor, a near mid-air collision (NMAC) occurred.
The following details the chain of events, human performance considerations, contributing factors, discovery, corrective actions, and additional post-flight findings.
Chain of Events
Departing from Battle Creek Executive Airport at Kellogg Field (KBTL) in Michigan, we leveled off at 3,000 feet before ascending to 5,500 feet MSL after exiting the lateral boundaries of the Class D airspace. Moderate turbulence and wind speeds prompted our climb to 5,500 feet MSL during the southbound departure.
Upon entering our designated practice area, we made an entry call on the radio, announcing our altitude of 5,500 feet MSL to alert other aircraft in the vicinity. I instructed the student to initiate a left climbing turn to a northerly heading to avoid cloud development and turbulence in the southeast.
As the student began the turn, they spotted nearby traffic to the southeast (traffic heading westbound and our approximately heading of 150), and the SkyWatch system alerted us to the presence of the same altitude traffic.
Although I hadn’t initially sighted the traffic, I assumed control from the student and expedited the turn and climb away from the other aircraft. We continued our climb to 6,500 feet MSL to maintain separation, with the other aircraft observed in a steep-banked left turn away from us.
Perceptions, Judgments, Decisions
The decision to initiate a left climbing turn to avoid turbulence and cloud development was appropriate given the weather conditions.
However, incomplete situational awareness led to potential conflict with nearby traffic.
Factors Affecting the Quality of Human Performance
Moderate turbulence and wind speeds increased workload and distracted attention from scanning for traffic.
Lack of visual confirmation of nearby traffic highlighted a lapse in situational awareness.
Actions or Inactions
Assuming control from the student and rapidly expediting the turn and climb away from the traffic demonstrated decisive action in mitigating the risk of a mid-air collision.
Contributing Factors
Weather conditions prompted a decision to maneuver away from turbulence and cloud development, leading to potential conflict with nearby traffic.
The other aircraft’s failure to initiate communication to ease separation heightened the potential for a conflict.
Discovery
The presence of nearby traffic was initially spotted by the student pilot, and the SkyWatch system alerted us to the same altitude traffic.
Visual confirmation of the other aircraft was made by the student pilot before I took control and expedited the turn and climb away from the potential conflict.
Corrective Actions
Enhanced emphasis on situational awareness and scanning techniques will be incorporated into future flight training sessions to mitigate the risk of similar incidents.
Review of procedures for communication and evasive action in the event of traffic conflicts will be conducted to ensure appropriate responses in similar situations.
Continued reinforcement of the importance of effective communication and vigilance during flight operations will be emphasized to prevent future near mid-air collisions.
Additional Post-flight Findings
Upon post-flight review, it was determined that the NMAC distance was approximately 6,000-7,000 feet horizontally and 50-100 feet vertically. While this distance may not strictly qualify as an NMAC, the evasive action taken was deemed necessary considering the potential hazards involved had there been any further delay in action.
Primary Problem: Human Factors
ACN: 2085028
Must work for the government as an aside to instructing —– a LOT of redundancy to say: He Came, We Saw, We Avoided. Press On.
Maybe everyone should listen to approach control or center to see who is going where instead of Fingers, NORDO, or remaining with CTAF/Tower ….
Traffic a mile distant, a non event. That’s why clearing turns are always made prior to beginning flight maneuvers.
Certainly turns a non event into a case study.
PS; what makes you think a transit aircraft is on the same frequency as you in a “designated”, as in local practice area?
My thoughts exactly. Why do local pilots at an airport where training is being done assume that aircraft transiting the area are on their “practice area” freq? How would they know to be on that freq? Who assigned that freq for that purpose and why isn’t it noted on the charts for this area?
These aren’t military pilots in an MOA.
Even in a MOA transient aircraft aren’t on freq—UHF, by the way.