This January 2009 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
Aircraft: Beech Musketeer. Injuries: None. Location: Lafayette, Ind. Aircraft damage: Substantial.
What reportedly happened: The pilot obtained a full weather briefing and filed an instrument flight plan prior to departing on the night flight. Shortly after departure, at an altitude of 5,000 feet MSL, he encountered icing conditions and felt a severe vibration in the aircraft flight controls, so he decided to return to the airport. During the approach to land, the plane continued to accumulate ice. It was descending at a rate of 1,500 feet per minute. The airplane broke out of the clouds at 1,750 feet MSL. The pilot couldn’t see the runway because the windscreen was completely covered with ice. The airplane touched down 40 feet short of the runway, then skidded to a stop. The wings and windscreen had approximately an inch of ice. The pilot reported that icing conditions were not forecasted or reported prior to his flight.
Probable cause: The pilot’s inadvertent encounter with icing conditions during initial climb. Contributing to the accident were the lack of visibility during the landing due to an ice-covered windscreen, and the structural ice that adversely affected the flight characteristics of the airplane.
For more information: NTSB.gov
TheDoc says “Regarding your inquiry as to the purpose of the NTSB in this matter…they have become so inept in their craft that they are virtually worthless as an entity charged with investigating and improving the safety of flight. It wasn’t always so. Now appointments to such positions are based on “politics†and individuals are appointed because of “partisanship†and are based upon sex or national origin of the appointee and have absolutely nothing to do with “knowledge, skill, ability or experience†in the field of aviation. This isn’t simply an observation, but is based upon serious research.”
Why don’t you retrain the NTSB since you are so qualified?
Ice is not nice! I learned about ice in a Cessna 172, after flying 45 minutes with light icing conditions. Ice was forecast in clouds and precipitation, but the radar didn’t show any precip. I was young and inexperienced, and we managed to be at full power and 80 knots to maintain altitude, fortunately we landed without incident. Flying out of the airport, we climbed right through the same area, and never had any ice.
As a former freight “dog”, I flew the midwest every day for a year, Cessna 310’s and 401’s. You learn quick that “ice is here” I am OUT OF HERE! No doubt, you get ice don’t wait, start climbing immediately, you may be just about at the tops. Why climb? You may not have that option if you wait, it is always easier to descend if necessary. Years after that, I would fly charters in C401/402/340/414A/421’s and could fly the season without ever having to cycle the boots.
In the case of the Musketeer, I have heard about the airfoil being unusual in ice, and that turbulence isn’t all that uncommon. Being it is underpowered anyway, ICE at night is something that calls for an immediate return to the airport. I am glad the guy is alright, we have all been there but by the grace of God, there I am.
This is a “serious example” of young pilots receiving an instrument rating, without the proper flight training to utilize it. I “cut my teeth”, as a young aviator flying charter in the part of the country in which this incident occurred, so am infinitely familiar with IMC there in the winter. This area of the country is known as a “transition zone” to knowledgeable instrument pilots. The fact that icing would be present should have been obvious to anyone “properly trained” in IFR, before they ever left the ground. Obviously this young pilot wasn’t trained in how to determine when icing would most likely be present or the adiabatic lapse rate table. Many years ago I conducted an impromptu study and determined that only 15% of those holding an instrument rating actually knew how to use it safely…the vast majority of whom were charter, corporate and airline pilots.
In response to Dennis Reiley’s comments above, Having flown a couple thousand hours in that part of the country, it is my experience that the sun doesn’t shine at night and a Musketeer can’t go but in one direction with even an inch of ice and that’s down at about 1500 FPM or more and almost no control stability what-so-ever! God definitely wasn’t busy at Kennedy that night and had some time to keep this fool safe to fly another day. It has been my experience that most all who have attempted to fly in that part of the mid-west in those conditions are now taking a “dirt nap”. Still further Mr. Reiley, 99% of the time “getting on top” above the icing, will not dissipate airframe icing, sun or not…it’s a matter of temperature differential between a cold airframe and static air temperature and yes…I’ve flown in a lot more ice than I care to think about!
The severe vibration the pilot mentioned is completely indicative of airframe (wing/flight surface) instability brought on by a “radical change” in the aerodynamic envelope of the aircraft, due to structural icing.
For the “uninitiated”, night IMC in a Musketeer is foolhardy anywhere, but in the mid-west in winter, even by the most experienced of instrument pilots, it’s a “death wish”. This individual is “truly blessed” by the “Gods of Flight” to still be alive to tell the tale!
Regarding your inquiry as to the purpose of the NTSB in this matter…they have become so inept in their craft that they are virtually worthless as an entity charged with investigating and improving the safety of flight. It wasn’t always so. Now appointments to such positions are based on “politics” and individuals are appointed because of “partisanship” and are based upon sex or national origin of the appointee and have absolutely nothing to do with “knowledge, skill, ability or experience” in the field of aviation. This isn’t simply an observation, but is based upon serious research.
Ice encounter at night. Whatever decision process led to the problem, my hat is off to the pilot who made it back to the airport, covered in ice, with no forward vision, and only bent the aircraft. It can be replaced, a life cannot. I’m sure the pilot learned something and I am further convinced at my level of competence, never, never, risk ice. I probably would not have made it back even close to the runway.
It’s hard to say what this guy did wrong, so where is the lesson? In my (very limited) experience of ice, the pitot goes first. However, it was the ice on the wings that led me to figure the inexplicable low airspeed was due to pitot ice. Pitot heater takes a LONG time to work! This guy was night IMC, so might well have had the pitot heat on anyway. The right thing to do, but it takes away your early warning. Being in the UK, not sure how the US Met reports ice risk, but you really have to assume if you’re in cloud above the freezing level (ALWAYS stated on UK met reports) that you will pick up some ice. A lot of information is missing from this report. For example, did the pilot use screen heat to keep the windscreen clear at the first sign of the screen icing up? Was the 1500ft/min descent rate with full power? What were the details of the Met report the pilot consulted? What was the role of air traffic in this incident?
Nothing was said about the pilot requesting icing information including what altitude it might extend to after he encountered it. Could he have climbed out of the icing conditions? Was there sun above that would reduce or eliminate the ice that had already formed? Could the aircraft continue the climb? While severe vibration in the controls can be life threatening, so can descending into icing conditions.
Does an NTSB investigation serve any useful purpose at the level it is run?