The Cessna 210 pilot began his descent in the airport traffic pattern at the airport in Duluth, Minnesota, when another airplane announced its position in the vicinity of the airport. The pilot turned his attention to the traffic and located it visually.
The traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) annunciated in the proximity of the other airplane.
The turn to the base leg was made after passing the traffic.
During the base and final legs, the gear warning horn annunciated and the pilot stated he had mistaken it for the TCAS.
The pilot landed with the gear retracted and the airplane sustained substantial damage to fuselage supporting structure.
The pilot reported he was wearing noise cancelling headphones during the flight, but did state he was able to hear the gear warning horn annunciate.
After the accident, the airplane was placed on jacks and the landing gear was extended using the airplane’s own systems and there was no indication of abnormal operation.
Probable cause: The pilot’s failure to extend the landing gear prior to landing, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage during landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s diverted attention to another airplane in the vicinity and that he inaccurately perceived the gear warning horn annunciator as the TCAS annunciator.
NTSB Identification: GAA15CA206
This July 2015 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.

On any given flight with two cockpit crew members, reading of checklist is required. More so in commercial airliners. After take-off, pilot not flying (PNF) calls “positive rate of climb” and the pilot flying (PF) calls for ‘Gears up”. This is later followed by reading the after take-off checklist.
Recently, Air India flight departed Kolkata for Mumbai. They realised that their airplane (Airbus) was not able to climb above FL 240. They also realised that they were consuming more fuel. Decision was made to divert to Nagpur. On the descent, the crew realised that landing gear was not retracted after take-off and the crew was not aware until descent was initiated.
It must be amazing to think and ponder what the crew were actually doing and talking during after take-off, take-off climb and cruise.
Gear up and locked – head up and locked!