• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
General Aviation News

General Aviation News

Because flying is cool

  • Pictures of the Day
    • Submit Picture of the Day
  • Stories
    • News
    • Features
    • Opinion
    • Products
    • NTSB Accidents
    • ASRS Reports
  • Comments
  • Classifieds
    • Place Classified Ad
  • Events
  • Digital Archives
  • Subscribe
  • Show Search
Hide Search

Instructional flight ends fatally

By NTSB · May 14, 2018 ·

The sport pilot had recently purchased the airframe-parachute-equipped light-sport airplane, a Jihlavan Airplanes SRO KP 5 ASA, and was receiving instruction in it to satisfy insurance requirements.

Radar data indicated that, during the flight, the airplane’s groundspeed decreased from 94 to 62 knots, consistent with airwork including slow flight and stall practice.

Subsequently, several witnesses observed the airplane descending nose-down with the parachute still attached, but with the canopy only partially inflated, before the airplane hit terrain near Rhoadesville, Virginia. Both souls aboard the plane died.

The parachute handle was located on the left side of the instrument panel, and the sport pilot likely activated the parachute due to inadvertent spin entry.

The previous owner of the airplane stated that he had to be vigilant during stall practice because the airplane always seemed to yaw abruptly right and into a spin, more so than any other airplane he had flown.

The parachute attached to the airframe via four risers. Two of the risers shared a front anchor attached to the aluminum bulkhead behind the seats. The other two risers attached to a rear anchor located at each wing root.

Examination of the wreckage revealed that the two front risers remained attached to the shared front anchor but that the anchor had separated from the airframe. The two rear risers had separated in overstress.

The front anchor was designed to carry the majority load. The remaining two rear risers were designed to stabilize the airplane in an optimal descent attitude and could not carry the full load if the front anchor failed.

Metallurgical examination of the separated front anchor revealed that it had been bolted into aluminum bulkhead skin that was about 0.022-inch thick.

Although the anchor and seven of its eight bolts remained intact, the surrounding aluminum skin of the airplane had separated from the airplane in overstress.

Without any additional supporting structure, such as longerons, stringers, or bathtub fittings, it is likely the thin aluminum skin could not withstand the force applied to the front anchor during parachute deployment.

The investigation noted that the first in-flight deployment of the parachute on the make and model airplane was on the accident airplane during the accident flight.

During certification, one test deployment was performed on the ground. Further, the airplane manufacturer was unable to provide any data or testing of the amount of shock force the surrounding aluminum skin could withstand during deployment.

The airplane’s maximum takeoff weight was 1,279 pounds. According to the parachute manufacturer, the parachute could be deployed at a maximum weight of 1,350 pounds and a maximum speed of 138 mph.

A representative of the parachute manufacturer stated that, although the engine should be off during parachute deployment, it did not have as significant an effect on deployment as airplane speed and weight.

Although the airplane was about 50 pounds over its maximum takeoff weight at the time of deployment, it was under the parachute manufacturer maximum weight of 1,350 pounds.

Additionally, the pilot likely activated the parachute in the early stages of a spin and closer to stall speed, significantly slower than the 138-mph parachute limit.

The sport pilot had chronic pain treated with multiple medications, including Methadone, an impairing opioid medication, which was detected in his blood at levels consistent with chronic use.

Further, he had insomnia and depression treated with quetiapine and doxepin, both of which are sedating medications.

The pilot’s recent use of the combination of two potentially impairing medications likely impaired his cognitive and psychomotor function to some degree. However, the investigation could not determine if the pilot’s impairment led to a situation that required activation of the parachute.

Additionally, there was no evidence that the decision to activate the parachute was inappropriate.

Therefore, it is likely that the pilot was impaired by the combination of medications, but there is no evidence that his impairment contributed to the cause of the accident.

Probable cause: The pilots’ loss of control that necessitated the activation of the parachute system and the airplane manufacturer’s inadequate design of the front parachute anchor attachment structure, which resulted in a failure of the parachute after it was deployed in flight and precluded the pilot from safely recovering from the spin.

NTSB Identification: ERA16FA194

This May 2016 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.

About NTSB

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in the other modes of transportation, including railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. It determines the probable causes of accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences.

Reader Interactions

Share this story

  • Share on Twitter Share on Twitter
  • Share on Facebook Share on Facebook
  • Share on LinkedIn Share on LinkedIn
  • Share on Reddit Share on Reddit
  • Share via Email Share via Email

Become better informed pilot.

Join 110,000 readers each month and get the latest news and entertainment from the world of general aviation direct to your inbox, daily.

This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Curious to know what fellow pilots think on random stories on the General Aviation News website? Click on our Recent Comments page to find out. Read our Comment Policy here.

Comments

  1. PJ says

    May 15, 2018 at 7:59 am

    Just did some Googling and some math and that thickness of aluminum is equivalent to about 5 times the thickness of a soda can wall. I’m surprised they didn’t see or feel the metal flexing when they were attaching the anchor.

  2. John says

    May 14, 2018 at 7:49 am

    And, of course, the pilot’s chronic disqualifying drug use was totally disconnected with his loss of control.

    • T Ibach says

      May 15, 2018 at 12:29 am

      well, I’m sure it had an effect on his abilities, but that being said, it appears that the airplane structures to which the chute was attached was insufficient, and improperly engineered/tested

    • Wylbur Wrong says

      May 15, 2018 at 7:24 am

      You do realize that there was an instructor on board? There is no way, at this time, to know if the instructor realized that they could not recover from the spin, and so pulled the handle or had the student/owner pull the handle to activate the chute.

      As long as the student/owner was following the instruction of the Instructor, things were going OK, so can we assume that the student didn’t appear impaired? Next, in a slow flight regime one can stall, and given what is said about that aircraft’s entry into a spin…

      The real problem here (IMHO) is an LSA with improper engineering, such that the chute pulled free because the location where it was attached did not have sufficient structural strength to handle the sudden “load” of chute deployment.

      • Dave says

        May 24, 2018 at 8:16 am

        Agreed!! I don’t understand why when drilling the holes for the attachment they didn’t notice that they were punching into thin aluminum. That’s just stupidity that goes along with running out of fuel. At least in my mind.

© 2025 Flyer Media, Inc. All rights reserved. Privacy Policy.

  • About
  • Advertise
  • Comment Policy
  • Contact Us
  • Privacy Policy
  • Writer’s Guidelines
  • Photographer’s Guidelines