By J. PUTMAN
Engine failure after takeoff is surely one of the most dreaded occurrences in aviation.
Whether you survive is dependent upon several factors.
Of course the pivotal issue in these situations is the amount of altitude available for maneuvering. Altitude and speed are invaluable resources, so preserving and maximizing them is of supreme importance.
If an engine failure does occur immediately — or nearly so — after takeoff, common wisdom dictates that a return to the runway is not recommended.
This, in turn, is based largely upon another assumption: That a pilot will not be able to do anything for the first five seconds after the engine cuts off due to the wave of shock and disbelief that temporarily immobilizes him or her.
To make matters worse, pilots will sometimes “freeze” with the airplane in climb attitude, bleeding off airspeed very rapidly. Attempting a turn at this point can easily result in the deadly stall-spin.
Why is the five-second freeze considered to be so intractable?
Our nervous systems are capable of responding very quickly. After all, when someone fires a gun in a restaurant or a crowd, does it take you five seconds to duck?
Remaining in climb attitude for five seconds without power will get you into trouble fairly quickly. Conventional wisdom says push the nose forward immediately, and for good reason. You are at best glide speed, or close to it, and are therefore in a better position to make your turn back (in relatively coordinated flight), assuming a turn back is a feasible option.
Avoid an aerodynamic stall no matter what. It’s healthier to fly into a telephone pole than stall and go straight into the ground, as such crashes are almost invariably fatal. As the great Bob Hoover once said, “Fly the plane as far into the crash as possible.”
So what exactly gets in the way of an immediate response?
There is something called the General Adaption Syndrome, outlined by Hungarian endocrinologist Han Selye, which describes the hard-wired response of vertebrate animals to a perceived threat to survival. Its more technical term is the Hypothalamic-Anterior Pituitary-Adrenal Axis.
The other component in this response involves a branch of the autonomic nervous system called the Sympathetic Nervous System (SNS).
The combined activation of these two systems is known more commonly as the “Fight or Flight Response.” As the term implies, it is an automatic response, taking place below the cerebral cortex (the thinking brain.)
If you are faced with a threat to your survival, nature doesn’t want you to think it over too much. It was not designed for a comprehensive examination of the facts in such situations. This immediate and automatic survival response is designed to keep us alive and has done so quite efficiently, long before the development of the neocortex.
As such, when an extreme emergency arises, the thinking brain is generally left out of the transaction. This is why severe anxiety eclipses your capacity for rational thought.
It is a hard-wired shutdown, not a character flaw or personal weakness. The cut off of the neocortex during periods of intense fear is automatic and has kept us alive — in most circumstances.
The fight or flight system came online when we were still being chased by animal predators and has had plenty of time and opportunity to refine and hone itself. It is designed to propel us into action in the face of life threatening danger: You either run from the threat or disable it.
But humans are new to the world of flying. There is no pre-programmed, evolution-guided, automatic response to a power failure in a single engine airplane 300′ off the ground.
So we have to program ourselves.
In an emergency situation you either cut off thinking so you can act or you cut off fear so you can think. The idea is to keep fear below the fight/flight tripwire.
The best way to do that is to familiarize yourself with the worst case scenario by thinking it all the way through in as much nuance and detail as possible — repeatedly. Consider it a somewhat uncomfortable form of “mindfulness” training, but a necessary one.
The best thing to do is practice and practice some more, and not just in the air. Practice involves a great deal of mental rehearsal. For every hour spent in the air, spend two hours mentally reviewing the flight, imagining all possible scenarios.
This is what the Blue Angels do. They spend hours sitting in a quiet room with their eyes closed imaging the nuances of every move. They actually sit in formation, listening to the commands of the leader. It is almost a meditative exercise and is considered to be a crucial part of their training.
Through focused mental rehearsal, pilots are training their visual, proprioceptive and vestibular systems. In performing such exercises, the aircraft almost becomes an extension of your own body.
Mental rehearsal is key. Since an engine out occurrence is most likely to happen at your beloved home airport, examine what you can do if the unthinkable happens there. Mentally visualize the takeoff run and the surrounding area. What would you do if your engine failed at 50′, 100′, 200′, 300′, etc.
At 50 you might have enough runway to spare to land on it. At 100′ to 200′ maybe a few S turns can keep you at least inside the perimeter. Airport property is generally flat and sparse and emergency services are within easy reach.
The given here is that, even if you can’t make the runway, it is better to land on the airport grounds (almost anywhere inside the fence) than go plowing out into a densely populated neighborhood.
Above 300’, examine what is directly and indirectly in front of you. Be creative. What if you turn your crosswind at a lower altitude? In that way you will be closer to the airport property and will already have turned the first 90° back to the airport if a failure should occur.
Whether you attempt a turn-back or go straight ahead, retaining airspeed by keeping the nose down to offset the power loss is imperative. Practice steep turns in the extreme nose down position. Kind of scary, but a pretty good way to stay out of a stall in an emergency turn back.
Another thing to be aware of is that after you have turned to your selected landing area and the ground is getting uncomfortably close and your landing point is still uncomfortably far, there is a tendency to pull the nose up without even realizing it — until it’s too late. Find what your limitations are.
Practice turn-backs to the airport at altitude. And of course, if you are attempting to return to the runway from which you took off, the turn is not a mere 180°. You will likely end up turning through ~ 300° before you’re done.
In a PA-28 or a C-172, I can turn through 270°, remain in coordinated flight and lose around 400′. What’s my secret? I’m snug and secure at 4,000′ and I know when the power loss is coming. I am also comforted by the fact that engine power is there waiting for me whenever I want it back. As such, it is a relatively relaxed event, so relaxed, in fact, that my Sympathetic Nervous System does not step in the way of a smooth response to the power loss.
The real thing near the ground is something else again. The paralyzing shock wave of fear is not part of the transaction when you’re over the practice area. So practice should be intended to shave precious seconds from the shock-induced time lag from engine failure to pitching down.
Mastering the Sympathetic Nervous System is part of overcoming the intractable nature of the five-second freeze. I say this having never faced the “real thing” and so these are merely suggestions and ideas to examine.
We don’t want pilots who are overconfident about turning back to the runway. But we also don’t want them to robotically go straight ahead when it may be endangering others.
Going straight ahead may not be an option. It may make sense from an aviating standpoint. But the question is what’s in front of you? A mall? A school yard full of kids?
At a given airport, we have to make all these decisions ahead of time. A life-saving response is not something you can expect to throw together in a moment of crisis as you may be forced to do something that you are not fully prepared to do in order to protect people on the ground.
John Putman M.A., M.S., is a pilot, as well as a clinician and researcher in the field of electroencephalography (EEG), neuro-feedback and neuro-diagnostics. He is also an engineer and a psychotherapist. He is affiliated with The EEG Institute and the San Fernando Valley Mental Health Center in Los Angeles.
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Just had to try this out in my Cessna 172N (which has a STOL kit and vortex generators). Went through the impossibe turn test with TO speed/configuration/power. Pulled the power, waited 5 seconds to ‘react’, holding everything steady, then lowered the nose and started the turn. During that wait time the airspeed dropped to 65K with no loss of altitude. Managed a shallow 225 degree turn in just over 350′! I would say a rule of thumb 400′ is the answer. I, quite frankly, am surprised that it was only 350’…I would certainly have expected more. That was with two people & full tanks (64gal) immediately after refueling, too!
The other part of the test that I need to figure out is the distance element. Obviously you’d be going slower during the turn and headed back to the airport. The question is: at 10-15 knots slower, can you cover the distance to the runway. I don’t know! Any thoughts on how to mathematically calculate that? Intuitively I do not think I’d make it, distance wise….I’d be on the right heading but short! More experimenting required! Appreciate any comments…..
Having had to deal with problem 3 times in my 50+ years of flying has merely reinforced my habit of a “what if” frame of mind being engaged when being involved in any aviation activity . It has saved me on 3 occasions when power failure during or shortly after T.O. was the cause. Make what if your frame of mind whenever you are engaged in any activity, especially aviation related ones. Paul
I have had 3 engine failures in single engine aeroplanes. A 4 seat Auster where the engine failed on “very” short finals, A Tipsy Nipper where the engine stopped while I was doing a stall turn and an engine failure in a Hawker Hunter at 25,000 ft. In all three events I got the aeroplane back on the ground without any damage to myself or the aeroplane. I also taught turn-backs to Royal Air Force student pilots in the Jet Provost. A tour as an engineering test pilot on the Hunter also meant that I experience a number of emergencies from rumbling engines to control anomalies. So what did I learn from all this excitement?
1. No matter how much you practice in the aeroplane or the simulator real emergencies don’t play out the way you have practiced.
2. When things “turn to worms” the “What the Hell is Happening” process you go through takes longer than you think it will. 5 seconds is probably an underestimate for a serious failure.
For many years the Royal Air Force taught turnbacks to ab initio students, great fun – 180 kts – screaming 60 degree bank turn – line up with the runway – job done. I believe this was attempted 3 times for real and didn’t work after which the RAF gave up teaching them. Theory and reality turned out to be two different things. Larry makes the point that he is happy to turn through 180 degrees in his 172 – The problem is that he has, in reality, turn through about 270 degrees – that is a real problem particularly if the initial turn is downwind. So, what to do if you have an engine failure at low altitude immediately after take-off? Aim for the best bit of ground, or water, you can see within about 30 degrees of your heading and don’t stall. below 1,000 ft a stall/spin is your worst nightmare. If you are operating close to a heavily built up area make sure you have briefed yourself as to your escape route so that in the event of an engine failure you “know where to go, before you go.”
The history of success of an actual turnback following an engine failure is pretty bleak; most seem to have ended up as a stall/spin accident from which there were no survivors. My personal rules for turnbacks are:-
Don’t think about them.
Don’t practice them.
Don’t try them for real.
Google “Biggin Hill Tomahawk crash” and you will see what I mean.
Thank you all for the excellent input. Over the years I’ve learned a great deal from publications such as GA News and in particular, the comments sections that follow. They can be a real goldmine of useful information…. So keep reading, writing and flying!
Thanks for a thoughtful piece. I had my own version of the “impossible turn” – lost power five miles short of the field in the dark. In my case, it was turning away from the lights of the airport’s town (and the airport), since there was no way I could make it to the field, and I’ve always sworn I would never injure any innocents on the ground; I looked for the darkest patch of ground – which I also thought may be less likely to have power liens. I’m here to testify that it is possible to poop your pants, swear, and still do what you’ve trained to do. Through a combination of luck (that dark patch could have been anything) and training (I flew the damn thing all the way down), we landed successfully and safely. I do credit the habit of constantly going through in my mind what I would do if I lost power at any given time – training can kick in and work in spite of the fear – it’s not about doing away with it. (I don’t think that’s what the author is saying, but just want to reiterate that it’s a both-and; it’s scary as hell.)
Barry Shiff and everyone who has seriously thought about and practiced the turn back stresses that a single engine that fails with the prop stopped or windmilling DOES NOT perform like the typical scenario we practice at a safe altitude. A true engine out results in none of the thrust and significantly more drag. In a true engine out on departure it is recommended that the pilot add 500 feet to the best return altitude loss demonstrated in practice.
I fly single-engine as a tow pilot (C-182 and PA-25-235). L/Ds of ~10:1.
I also train students in gliders and sometimes in motorgliders that self-launch. Those machines can have from a 20:1 to a 45:1 glide ratio. Our Private Glider Practical Test Standards require training and proficiency in Area IV.G. Abnormal Occurrences in Takeoff.
When training, I require the pretakeoff checklist to include an announcement of Wind direction and speed and a correlated Emergency Plan.
The Emergency Plan is a statement of the progressive landing alternatives from the initial launch roll until the pilot states they can return to a normal pattern entry and landing. After this Plan enunciation, we depart and the student again announces each landable alternative as they are presented and would be used – during the climb out.
This audible announcement — looking, judging, speaking — means that any emergency can then skip the delay and assessment interval — and the student will execute the return to the place they have just announced. And they receive several aborted takeoffs in training with me. They do all variations of balked departures — land ahead on remaining runway, execute a 180 and land the reciprocal ( if weather allows), and abbreviate into a tiny closed pattern. The only alternative we skip is the brief moments when the only decent choice is landing “outside the premises”. But they must visually assess Where the best spot ‘outside’ IS. That place may not be straight ahead. There will be days when a reciprocal return is NOT appropriate, ie. wind >10 knots and launching in a big span glider on narrow premises or with a crappy wheel brake.
The best bank angle for return is 45*, the best compromise between turn rate, turn radius and wing loading/stall speed increase. But then most ASEL folks get nervous at more than 30*. That comment will likely spark another argument….
We are talking about teaching JUDGMENT, which is a serious and complex job. If the expectations by CFIs include this situational awareness, the students will rise to the demand. I, for one, am glad to see the FAA shift back toward the expectation that ASEL CFIs should be training for this awareness and skill set. Thanks to the Mr. Schiffs for keeping this discussion alive for the last 40 years. If there hadn’t been an ATP or two as proponents, I believe ‘discussing turn-backs’ wouldn’t have happened.
There have been several articles recently in AOPA, Flying, and other pubs, regarding the ‘impossible turn’. The point of all of them is that under certain conditions, and with appropriate pilot training beforehand (at altitude), the turn back to the runway on engine failure can be accomplished UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS.
AOPA’s Barry Schiff has successfully performed this maneuver many times and advocates, not FOR doing it, but doing it ONLY when not doing so is more dangerous. Examples include buildings and/or terrain straight ahead that make landing a huge or dangerous challenge.
As a matter of fact, the FAA has also provided modified guidance on this topic to state that ‘instructors should instruct pilots on the appropriate technique to turn back to the departure runway upon engine failure on or shortly after takeoff’ (paraphrased). The operative phrase in their guidance is that the turn back ‘should be used ONLY in situations where it is obviously more dangerous not to’ meaning, proceeding straight ahead poses more overall danger to pilot safety or safety of those on the ground, than turning back to the runway. Otherwise, the almost-always guidance of landing straight ahead or within 30-45 degrees of heading applies.
Implicit in the FAA guidance is that training and repetitive practice of the maneuver at altitude, for all aircraft one is likely to fly, is imperative. This is to develop precise flight profiles and parameters under which the turn back can be safely attempted.
Thanks for the great response Larry. As you probably know -the FAA has changed its stance and is now revisiting the turn back option.
Yes, I AM aware of that, John. And … we haven’t visited what the wind was doing, possibly being IFR vs VFR or WX/cloud conditions, other airplanes and the rapid terrain dropoff (Catalina Is). THAT is why your article was so poignant. Mentally PREPARE ahead of time for the unthinkable. Maintain situational awareness. Have a plan. Execute.
Another thing I teach myself to do is to take command of any situation. Screaming or poo’ing your pants ain’t gonna do much. 🙂 Of course, if you’re flying with CAPS … none of this applies … you just remember where the magic handle is and have a drink while you’re floating down.
Many years ago co-piloting a Bonanza in Kansas, we got too close to a thunderstorm and got violently upset by it. The airplane wound up almost upside down for a bit. The heavy old carbon mike hit the pilot in the lips and he was gushing blood. I lost all control over my senses and actually saw my dead body in the crash scene. I was shaking uncontrollably. From that, I learned exactly what I said above. Self-control. Even under duress … maintain self-control because YOU are the only one that’s gonna get you out of whatever it is you’ve gotten yourself into.
Of course, if you’re on the Titanic … I guess all you can do is enjoy the band and rearrange the deck chairs.
Usually, the stomach and the throat trade’s places, then, once the heart rate slows back to normal, the brain begins working again, to find the most suitable strip for landing.
Dangerous advise to allege the “impossible turn” is possible. One can theorize every tiny component of the failure event and somehow chop together a pathway to success but it’s a fool’s errand. Unless you are at pattern altitude or better don’t try it…have in your mind where you are going to set down straight or near straight ahead before you start the takeoff roll.
I didn’t “get” that the author was espousing anything but pre-planning what you’ll do when and if the situation calls for immediate and coherent mental and physical response to an emergency. The “five second” period could make the difference. AND … it’s something I think of all the time. What if and … what will I do.
“At pattern altitude or better.” What’re you flying …a 747? There are major differences between airplanes and even the same airplane if it’s light or at gross. I’ve been flying both a short coupled PA28 (with a 30′ Hershey bar wing) and a C172M (with a camber lift wing). There are BIG differences between these airplanes which I normally fly light. There are things I’d do with my C172 that I’d never consider with the PA28. The C172 just doesn’t want to stop flying so airspeed control on final is paramount. The PA28 wants to sink and makes a clean and immediate transition from flying to not flying. These are the things the author is talking about. Now toss in taking advantage of that wasted short five seconds and you’re on the road to success in an emergency.
I took helicopter lessons in a Robinson R22. In that machine, recognition of power loss and what you do before beginning the autorotation sequence taught me much about fixed wing emergencies … like immediately trading airspeed (but not too much) for altitude and then reacting appropriately.
I do NOT buy that you can’t make a 180 + deg turn in my C172 but I’d have to think about it some more in the PA28. Where I normally fly, there is a grass runway tangential to the main hard runway. Those’d be available IF necessary.
Bottom line … one size does NOT fit all and teaching a student to crash straight ahead IMHO is a mistake. Reacting appropriately IS the correct answer. Thinking about it every time and occasionally practicing for it makes it even better … if there is a ‘better’ in an emergency power loss.
Biggs has an airframe parachute so he doesn’t have to think about what he can or can’t do relative to flying the airplane. For those of us not so fortunate the author offers some excellent advice.
Yes. I fly a Cirrus. But I still need 600 feet before I can pull. So like everyone else, I also have to plan for an aborted takeoff and/or an engine out.
The author does try to make the case that the impossible turn is possible. “That a pilot will not be able to do anything for the first five seconds after the engine cuts off due to the wave of shock and disbelief that temporarily immobilizes him or her.”
The assumption being that if one trains to react immediately the turn is possible. That is a LARGE leap in assuming. IMHO. And if buying the assumption causes anyone to not plan for the straight ahead emergency landing then I believe this is dangerous advise.
Yes, first thought after engine failure, “fly the airplane first” …….and then fly the airplane.
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