A close acquaintance recently admitted that when she boards an airliner she always takes a peek into the cockpit before turning to find her seat.
That doesn’t surprise me. The cockpit is a land of mystery and intrigue that calls out to so many of our non-pilot brothers and sisters. The gauges, switches, lights, and breakers were a visual cacophony of delight in the old days. Now a smattering of glass panels suggest the pilots might be monitoring multiple streaming providers to fight off boredom. Perhaps the captain is binge-watching “Better Call Saul” on one side while the first officer is re-watching “Breaking Bad” on the other.
Of course those glass panels actually serve a great function — a purpose that escapes the understanding of the average traveler.
Then again, pilots themselves sometimes miss the point of what their tools or procedures are all about. I suspect any of us who are honest with ourselves about the level of ignorance we carried when we began this journey would agree. Those who would argue the point tend to unintentionally display their continued lack of understanding.
We don’t know what we don’t know, until someone helps us learn it. Should we somehow get past the educational requirements of flight training without ever grasping the basics, we’re as lost as we might be on an Algebra II test, if we chose to skip Algebra I and go straight to the big time.
Stalls are a good example of the phenomenon of misunderstanding. We tend to grasp onto what appears to be obvious, only to find later we should have been reading between the lines.
Initially, many flight students hear the term “stall” and immediately shudder at the thought that they’ll be airborne with a dead engine that won’t start. I believe I suffered from that misconception for a short time.
And why wouldn’t I? The term wasn’t unknown to me. It was the context that was new. Hence, confusion and misunderstanding rule the day until an important lesson is learned.
Our secondary misunderstanding about stalls tends to be that performing the stall well is an important part of our flight training — and perhaps the most nerve-wracking procedure we’re compelled to demonstrate to our instructor and our examiner.
Yet, in reality, the stall itself is of minimal importance. While it may seem otherwise — after all the word “stall” appears in the Private Pilot Airman Certification Standard 110 times — the stall itself is secondary to exhibiting an understanding of what the stall is, how it occurs, and a demonstration of our ability to recover from the loss of lift, all while maintaining control of the aircraft throughout.
In a very real sense, the only reason we are required to stall an airplane in the testing environment is so we can demonstrate our ability to recover from the stall. There is no standard listed in the ACS for how much altitude we can gain, only the amount we’re allowed to lose. We can perform the power on stall (formerly known as a departure stall) at any power setting above 65%. Full throttle may be how our CFI taught it to us, but full throttle is not a requirement.
Perhaps because how we choose to demonstrate the stalling of the airplane is not all that big a deal — it’s the recovery that matters. And it matters a lot.
In the IFR realm the same confusion comes into play for most of us when we learn instrument approaches. Most instrument instructors will have their students perform the full approach as published, without any insight beyond what’s on the page. I’ve met more than a few instrument students who were led to believe they’ll be flying the full approach most of the time when they get out on their own. They have no idea that vectors to final will be far more common.
Can you imagine what the traffic would look like at LAX, ORD, or EWR if every arriving transport category aircraft flew the full approach, procedure turn and all? It would work, but it wouldn’t be the most efficient use of crews, ATC, flight time, or fuel.
At the end of that full approach, CFIIs will often have their students go missed, mostly for the efficient use of their flight time. A series of missed approaches allows for more approaches in the time allocated for a lesson. But if the student always goes missed, and if they always go missed at the missed approach point, and if they never actually shoot the approach to a landing, have they really understood what the purpose of the approach and going missed is?
Probably not.
In real life we might initiate a missed approach because we’re not stabilized, or because we’re not fully set up for the approach, or because we encounter unanticipated traffic along our path of flight, or an obstacle of some sort, flocks of birds included.
Why not break off the approach two miles out now and then? Why not go for the full approach and landing occasionally? Landing is the point of the procedure. Going missed is the fallback position if we don’t get the runway environment in sight. Why teach only one outcome to the exclusion of others?
IFR flight has to include an understanding that we’re on the lookout for the expected (the runway) and the unexpected (anything other than a clear view of the runway). Either way, our job as a pilot is to understand, apply our skills, and deal with the situation safely.
What we know and what we think we know are two very different things. Whether we’re in training or at the end of long years of service, we would do well to keep our eyes and our options open.
After all, the passengers aren’t the only ones who don’t have a complete understanding of what’s happening up in the front seats. Each of us should routinely be open to learning.
It’s a far safer perspective than the ego-soaked alternative.
What happened to the Falling Leaf training ??
Funny, when I learned to fly in the late 60’s to early 70’s; they were called “power off”, “power on”, and “accelerated stalls”. Then they changed them to “departure stalls” etc. Now they’re going back to calling them “power on stalls”, etc.. Sometimes I wonder if the government has any clue to what they’re doing.
RE: “GA vs Big Iron,” I recently witnessed a very experienced “Big Iron” transport pilot “panic and pull” during a stall demonstration while training in a Level D sim. Almost unbelievably, he stalled and continued to pull back all the way into the “ground” (just like the Air France accident). Thankfully this was a sim, but will this ever be fixed in his reflexes?
Incorrect initial training or inaccurate procedures that were reinforced can persist forever it seems. ATP-level training required us to “power out of stalls” for years, and in many cases this may still be embedded.
Ignorance and errors are a “human problem” not unique to any particular airframe. To be safe we must constantly stay vigilant and self-aware, searching for “errors in our own code.” These latent errors may hide hidden for years and only display during times of greatest need (panic). Awareness of potential ignorance keeps us humble and constantly learning.
First off, a stall IS loss if control of the aircraft. Momentary until proper recovery (as trained) is obtained. Or we could shorten all the runways and control stall to landing. When swept wing heavys are unintentionally stalled, there is most likely disaster. And this is not a common training procedure in these aircraft. On the other hand, ” approach to stall is” …..and the recovery is quite different. Heavys are equipped with many stall avoidance systems ( voice, stick shaker, stick puller, etc and becoming more and more automated and avoided. AND recovery with a heavy is very very different. A heavy you will advznce throttles and pull back on the yoke at buffet. This reduces the thousands of feet for recovery and your guarantee of a wing drop. This is accompished at first sign if a buffet. Like a cessna though and today’s instructor, a complete stall is rarely practiced. Usually a buffet or the instructor will yelp “stall” as his shaking arms jump up for the yoke. Even a straight wing cessna will drop a wing and do a half turn spin at FULL stall BUT try to keep it in that spin…. they won’t unless you really really fight for it and stretch cables to theur limits. What do you think a baggage compartment weight limitation is for? Unless you have a acrobatic plane designed to whip around and go flat, you will loose in the range of 1000 feet on a complete turn. Now imagine a heavy. But as they call it Murphys law, a stall does and will show up at your doorstep unplanned and like everybody here says… is a MUST to know what to do with it. I have stalled, looped and rolled EVERY passenger jet and general I have flown. Was my job and I loved it. To include the early series MDs, Boing 70, 71. 72, 73, Bach 111 and finished up with our small jets to include IA jets,
Lear, Hawker, Gulfstream, commanders etc. Training is to avoid this situation and recover from your fake stall. Students….ask for a spin. But start with a floor of 5000 at least. The training has changed not the aircraft do don’t worry…. it will not come apart. As well, if you are bored and get close to a turbojet, stand at the wingtip, take 10 steps back… and look at the twist in the wings. Easier to see on a jet but they all have it unless its an aerobatic or has devises on the wing. Soooo. Sorry to bore you and I’m not saying it won’t happen. As Murphys law has it, my old Mooney bit me while I was getting busy in it. No autopilot, just trimmed up and let it porpose… all 1 minute of it;) Well it decided to turn around on us UNEXPECTEDLY. Had my last kid too UNEXPECTEDLY at 55yrs old from that. So… go take a 20 min ride in a pitts or extra and get some real stall recovery at least once.
Still here to talk about it, DANIEL J.
DOUGLAS BOEING AEROSPACE R&D
CHEERS!!!
Way cool, Dan. I had my last child at 50. Looks like you win the prize!
I think the recognition of an imminent stall is worth ten times its weight in stall recovery. Who stalls and spins with room to recover in the first place? That’s the whole problem.
Basically there are 3 kinds of stalls the Joe Blow knows about.
A horse stall at the OK CORRAL.
A car stalled on the freeway and the Hollywood unmediated dive to the crash.
Fear blocks learning and many students are afraid.
I had a student who was afraid of stalls because the CFI she began with didn’t address her fear. He cautioned me that she would grab him with Save Me fear.
I began our first lesson with the statement we were going to do the worst thing the plane could do. Said she’d gave to kiss me on the cheek if she grabbed me. Did delayed recovery cross control stall which involved inverted spin entry. She did kiss my cheek once. But she learned that she could see and recover by herself on the second stall. She kissed my check a week later after her her solo. Stalls are safe at 1 inch or 5000 gal.
My first stall recovery practice was in a Cherokee 140. The last one in a B-757. The procedure never changes and we practice them every six months in the sim and you better do it right. Basic flying is basic flying.
Thanks for the article. I missed the memo when they changed departure stall to power on stall and arrival stall to power off stall. Those stalls can happen anywhere, not just around an airport.
I like your comments on Instrument training, but not the slant of the discussion on stalls. The FAA has lowered the standard of performance and experience steadily since 1949 (C.A.A. then, I think). We hear terms like “competency based training” as if every pilot didn’t have to show competency prior to advancing to the next level. Yet we also witness lots of angst and hand wringing about the high levels of loss of control accidents. I think as an industry, we have abdicated our responsibility to ensure that pilots have superb attitude based aircraft control concepts and skills at every stage of development. As a result, we see loss of control at or near the top of the list for accident causation factors. It should be at the bottom of the list. Learning to control the airplane all the way through a stall with precision and confidence is an important element in this process. And nowhere is this more important than in the pre-solo phase of flight.
Assuming the instructors aren’t the weak link and everyone is actually capable of comprehending. A clue may be it’s still the same discussions and dilemmas after how many decades? Some can and some cannot to certain degrees.
I don’t agree with the introductory premise of “Missing the Point,” suggesting that professional flight crews are somehow lacking in understanding their “tools and procedures.” The rest of the article raises some good points about primary flight training, but that bears no direct relation to an airline cockpit. Sure, primary training is a starting point for us all, but by the time a person reaches the ATP level and is type rated in a passenger jet, they better know their stuff.
As a 17 year-old, I learned in a C-150, mastering stalls and spins (back when a CFI would actually teach spins and spin recoveries). Went on to a 21 year career as a USAF pilot and 19 years in the airlines. In all that time, I never thought training was lacking, or standards too lax. Of course, that may have changed in current times of pilot shortages. Hopefully not.
Yes, there are the rare weak links (children of the magenta line who stall an Airbus into the Atlantic ocean). But to say, “After all, the passengers aren’t the only ones who don’t have a complete understanding of what’s happening up in the front seats” is a poor choice of words that demeans the majority of pros up front who deliver the safest mode of travel in the word.
I’m a fan of Jamie, but this one “missed the point.”
Jim, I have to admit it never occurred to me that someone would read this column and misconstrue it to be aimed at airline pilots. The venue and the overall content is specifically aimed at General Aviation pilots and student pilots. They are enthusiastic participants, often with a real interest in being safe and reliable. Yet, we are all to some degree the product of our training. Hence, the discussion about stalls, full approaches, missed approaches, and understanding why we’re performing the tasks assigned to us. None of which are tasks common to the air transport industry.
Thanks for reading and commenting. I’ll be re-reading a few times to see where the misunderstanding might have been born. I appreciate the perspective.
I think You, Mr. Jim, are the one that “missed the point” of what was written by Mr. Jamie Becket. When I’ve read his article it immediately remained clear it was intended to be pointed to the GA pilots, not the airline’s ones.
But, well, the different points of view are so common in humans that I, sometimes, ask myself if I’m the one that is wrong.