This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.
Myself and a CFII rated pilot filed an IFR flight plan from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. It was briefed that, on this leg, I was pilot in command (PIC) of the SR22 and would be under the usage of foggles, while the CFII rated pilot would be the safety pilot and handle all radio calls. The CFII was not acting as CFII, but as a safety pilot.
It was CAVU, but we filed anyway to have usage of ATC services and to practice in the system.
About 20 miles out of ZZZ, we were having a tough time with ATC transmissions due to the terrain, and were given a lower altitude to start our approach. Our primary flight display (PFD) had the latest METAR at ZZZ, which had the winds variable at 4 knots.
My safety pilot called the field in sight to ATC, at which time they asked if we wanted to cancel IFR and proceed VFR. He canceled for ease of trying to communicate with broken signal approximately 20 miles north of the field.
I set up to mirror the RNAV approach to Runway XX, as we were coming from the north and it aligned well. We did not perform the published RNAV as we were visual to Runway XX.
The safety pilot called out on Unicom at 20, 15, 10, and fives miles our intent. We heard other planes in the pattern using Runway XY, and were monitoring their position, but did not have visual contact on any of them.
As we were on short final, a pilot inquired about our position, in which the safety pilot said “on short final, one mile out.”
I did not hear a clear response, but apparently she said “I’m going to start my roll on XY.”
During this time, I visually obtained the windsock at the end of XX, and confirmed we had chosen the downwind approach correctly. I was focused on the approach and touchdown point at this phase and didn’t hear any other radio transmissions, so I assumed she was waiting on our arrival.
As I was just about to flare, the safety pilot called out “my controls” and we successfully transferred flight responsibilities within our airplane.
I looked immediately to the left, and saw a Cessna in a climb directly over our wingtip as the safety pilot successfully finished the landing.
I estimate we were 300 feet from the location of the Cessna, and they overflew us by about 200 feet.
On a debrief with my safety pilot on the taxi back in, we discussed the radio transmissions between us and the Cessna and what we could have done differently.
Even though we thought we were very communicative on call outs during the approach phase, when she announced something we didn’t understand, we should have broken off our approach or told her to stop her roll, or both, until the conflict was resolved by both parties.
As we continued our taxi back in, we obtained a visual on the other windsock on the field, which was clearly indicating Runway XY would have been preferred, which was in direct conflict as the other windsock at the end of Runway XX.
Primary Problem: Human Factors
ACN: 1993369
Why don’t GA pilots fly with PCAS like Zaon XRX is beyond me? Aircraft blind spot monitoring, ESP, fire protection, airframe parachute, etc should be made mandatory by FAA…it’s 2023 for God’s sake, not 1960 anymore.
If you’re practicing approaches in VMC, it is perfectly acceptable to break off the approach, enter the traffic pattern, and land on the runway everyone else is using. As long as you pass the final approach fix, you can log the approach. You can consider it a circle to land maneuver.
If you prefer to practice a straight in approach, use the preferred runway.
Not sure I understand this “During this time, I visually obtained the windsock at the end of XX, and confirmed we had chosen the downwind approach correctly. I was focused on the approach and touchdown point at this phase and didn’t hear any other radio transmissions, so I assumed she was waiting on our arrival.”
Downwind, was it Circle to Land Approach? Pretty sure I don’t understand what he is trying to say. (It might be just me.)
This is also a case where the actual airport and runways would be of huge benefit to understand what he is saying.
Another fine example that the GA hobby is more dangerous than bowling. This newsletter service chronicles incidents like this daily. Pilots are born with 9 lives and run through them during their lifetime. It seems no matter hard pilots try, danger looms ever near and ready to provoke disaster and loss of life. If the ‘skeeters don’t get you, the ‘gagors will.
Regards/J
It is only as dangerous as the pilots flying it and the age of the aircraft (older aircraft has primitive tech, less safety features, more wear and tear). One should set personal minimums such as flying only with PCAS such as Zaon XRX, take off from runways only with enough clearance. It is true GA is more dangerous than commercial aviation because many people in it are not discerning when it comes to safety.
I also don’t like to get in planes older than 30 years and something that’s made in 2008 or later since they have better safety engineering and tech.
So you heard traffic in the pattern using XY but you continued straight in to XX, even admitting you heard a pilot stating “starting my roll on XY”. What you should have flown was the correct pattern entry for XY. Pilots like you are examples I use to my students that not everyone enters the pattern correctly. Sure no regulation against what you did but you might want to take a look at Advisory Circular 90-66C.
All true, but I can’t understand starting to roll on either runway when an aircraft is on late final. Perhaps the radio equipment causing issues before was not transmitting properly and might have contributed to the Cessna taking off?
“Sure no regulation against what you did”. See new paragraph 9.13 in the AC, Pilot Responsibility to See and Avoid and Pilot Avoiding Careless and Reckless Operations (§ 91.13). The Chief Counsel interpretations I’ve read indicate that the guidelines recommended in Handbooks, the AIM, and in AC’s can be/are used to determine whether there is a regulatory violation (91.13). So there is a close connection with recommended guidelines and regulations.
Because all details of this incident are not spelled out, my comments are general and may or may not be applicable to this incident. First off, when landing at uncontrolled airports in actual VFR conditions, flying a standard pattern and observing traffic, runway conditions, wind, etc. is just as critical as making announcements on the radio. At many uncontrolled airports during day VFR there may be aircraft legally operating without lights, ADS-B, or even radios. Secondly, before operating at an uncontrolled airport, a pilot should be aware of established patterns, noise avoidance procedures, calm-wind runways, and recommended runways for terrain avoidance (which may vary depending on if landing or taking off). Lastly, although not always convenient, practicing straight-in type approaches (in actual VFR) is ideally done at a controlled airport. No matter what type of aircraft, avionics, or ratings one has, operations should be appropriate for the type of airport and airspace involved.