On Dec. 21, 2022, a Grumman American AA-5B, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at the Port of South Louisiana Executive Regional Airport (KAPS) in Reserve, Louisiana.
The flight instructor reported that the purpose of the night flight was to fly multiple instrument approaches at several airports before returning to KAPS.
He observed no issues with the airplane or its engine during his preflight inspection and engine run-up. The airplane had about 50 gallons of fuel available before the flight.
The flight instructor obtained an instrument clearance from New Orleans Approach Control before taxiing onto Runway 35 for takeoff. He reported the engine rpm, fuel flow, and engine temperatures were normal during the takeoff and initial climb, however shortly after the airplane climbed into instrument meteorological conditions there was a sudden loss of engine power.
The flight instructor reported that he felt and heard the engine lose power at least twice, and he immediately entered a left 180° turn back to the airport. The airplane was about 380 feet above the ground when it descended below the overcast cloud ceiling on a south heading.
Based on the airplane’s altitude, ground speed, and the canal off the end of Runway 17, the CFI told investigators that he believed the safest option was to land on the taxiway versus trying to land on the remaining runway.
The airplane was about 2 feet above the ground when the left wingtip hit the ground, and the nose gear subsequently collapsed when it hit soft terrain.
After the accident, the flight instructor repositioned the fuel valve to off, leaned the fuel mixture, and turned off the magneto and electrical master switches.
The pilot receiving instruction reported that before the flight he observed his flight instructor strain the fuel system and that there was no evidence of contamination.
He reported that the before-takeoff engine run-up, takeoff, and the initial climb were uneventful. However, about 500 feet above the ground, the engine began “coughing/sputtering” and there was a decrease in engine rpm.
The flight instructor immediately took control of the airplane and entered a left turn back to the airport.
The pilot receiving instruction stated that after the airplane descended below the clouds there was not enough runway remaining to safely land on Runway 17 and that the flight instructor made a left turn toward the taxiway. He reported that the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall a couple of feet above the ground and the left wing hit the ground.
When interviewed by an FAA operations inspector, the flight instructor stated that the engine speed decreased to about 1,400 rpm when the loss of engine power occurred during the climb. The flight instructor stated that he leaned the fuel mixture after the loss of engine power, which resulted in a 200 rpm increase in engine speed. The electric fuel pump was already turned on for the takeoff. The flight instructor stated that he did not use carburetor heat after the loss of engine power.
According to a carburetor icing probability chart contained in FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-09-35, Carburetor Icing Prevention, the recorded temperature and dew point at the time of the accident were in the range of susceptibility for the formation of serious carburetor icing at cruise engine power.
According to the bulletin, a pilot should use carburetor heat when operating the engine at low power settings or while in weather conditions in which carburetor icing is probable.
Probable Cause: The partial loss of engine power due to carburetor icing and the flight instructor’s failure to use carburetor heat in weather conditions conducive to serious carburetor icing.
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This December 2022 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
According to PeterH: “Unfortunately, this is just the latest example of an accident caused by a completely failed FAA.”
In this “latest example….”? I don’t think so.
I get that it is very…fashionable…to bash the Feds for everything…but not this time:
This one is on the CFI, not the FAA.
I’m all for introducing any new technology that makes flying easier and safer…and reducing the FAA’s “burdensome” administrative requirements is a key step needed to facilitate those efforts.
However, if this CFI had just applied “Carb Heat”, as directed in the printed checklist for his ancient 1977 Grumman Tiger…or avoided the hazardous icing conditions in the first place…we wouldn’t be having this discussion.
Unfortunately, this is just the latest example of an accident caused by a completely failed FAA.
According to the FAA, “its primary mission is to ensure safety of civil aviation.” Also, according to the FAA, its responsibilities include “Encouraging and developing civil aeronautics, including new aviation technology;”
And yet here we are in 2024 using magnetos as well as ice-prone carburetors with manual mixture control. Guess how far you have to go back to find a new car with such completely outdated technology?
Better and much safer technology has literally been available for generations and yet, what is the FAA doing to promote and encourage the use of such better and safer technology?? NOTHING – because it is much easier for the FAA’s butt-covering bureaucrats to write regulations and rules with never-ending and burdensome requirements that remove any incentive for industry to progress!
It is amazing what bureaucrats will do when the real driver is life-long employment! Due to such “help” from the FAA it is still much easier for industry to avoid liability by simply using completely outdated, hundred-year-old, but “FAA-approved” technology.
We can only hope that MOSAIC will solve some of these problems, but if history is a guide, the only real long-term solution will be to get the FAA completely out of the regulation of small aircraft design, construction, and maintenance. DOGE, are you reading this?
As with pretty much every, relatively-modern, carburetor-equipped aircraft: The use of ‘Carburetor Heat’ is directed/discussed multiple times in the Grumman American AA-5B Tiger POH’s Section 3 “Emergency Procedures”, in both the Operational Checklist and Amplified Procedures sections.
Besides apparently not being familiar enough with the aircraft he is “instructing” in, the CFI’s obvious lack of knowledge concerning the “basics” of carburetor ice, including the how, when, where & why it forms…and how to deal with it…is a big RED Flag.
Hey….I got a great idea……Lets go flying with a student at night in instrument meteorological conditions.
May be unrelated, but my only experience with carb ice in cruise or any other time was in the two seat Grumman American AA-1B. I think it was my third lesson in 75 and I had no idea yet why the engine would be running rough. And it did panic me a bit. My instructor applied carb heat and the engine returned to normal power.