According to flight track records, on Jan. 6, 2023, the pilot departed his home airport of Stafford Regional Airport (KRMN) in Virginia, and arrived at Concord-Padgett Regional Airport (KJQF) in North Carolina in his Piper PA-28-180.
On Jan. 8, 2023, he departed KJQF and arrived at Cherokee County Regional Airport (KCNI) in Georgia. The purpose of the trip was work-related meetings.
According to FBO personnel at KCNI, about 16:00 on the day of the accident, the pilot arrived at the airport via rental car and requested that his airplane be fueled. The FBO personnel were unable to do so at that time due to heavy rain and lightning nearby.
FBO personnel reported that they had a discussion with the pilot on his plan to take off in poor weather and fly at night. The pilot stated that “after the rain passes it should be fine right?”
The pilot further stated that he had an international flight scheduled to Europe the following day from the Washington, D.C., area and wanted to leave as soon as possible.
The staff reported that after further discussion, the pilot agreed for them to book him a hotel in the area. The staff also provided the code to the airport gate should he want to arrive in the morning before the FBO opened. The pilot subsequently left the airport in the rental car.
Fuel records showed that, later in the evening, the pilot returned to the airport after the FBO had closed and, via self-service, added 27 gallons of 100LL to his airplane.
According to ADS-B flight track data, at 20:05 the airplane departed Runway 23 at KCNI. The airplane flew on varying headings towards the east-northeast and continued to climb for about 10 minutes, reaching a peak altitude of about 7,200 feet mean sea level (MSL).
In the final two minutes of the flight, the airplane began to descend, followed by a series of tight turns before the airplane entered a rapidly descending spiral turn.
The airplane’s final position was recorded at 20:17:32, about .15-mile south of the accident site at an altitude of about 2,000 feet.
A witness who was about a mile from the accident site saw what she believed to be an airplane descending and turning/spinning towards the ground. She saw a white light and an orange light and heard a loud engine up until the moment of impact. After the sound of impact, she did not hear anything further from the airplane, nor was there an explosion or fire.
On Jan. 13, 2023, about 09:00, an FAA Alert Notice (ALNOT) for a missing aircraft was issued after family members notified the FAA of the missing airplane. The wreckage was located several hours later.
According to FAA air traffic control (ATC) records and the FAA’s contract Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) provider Leidos, there was no known communication between the pilot and ATC, nor was there a VFR flight plan on file for the accident flight.
According to ForeFlight account data, the most recent route of flight entered at 18:22 was for a direct route from KCNI to the pilot’s home airport, with an en route altitude of 7,500 feet.
According to a National Transportation Safety Board weather study, areas of precipitation, convective weather, and clouds were near the departure airport and along the pilot’s route of flight and altitude flown.
The closest weather reporting location to the accident site was from the departure airport, KCNI, located about 14 miles west of the accident site at an elevation of 1,219 feet. The observations issued closest to the time of the departure time of 20:05 observed visibility 10 statute miles, scattered clouds at 700 feet above ground level, and scattered clouds at 7,500 feet.
At 20:15, which was the observation nearest the accident time, visibility was 1 mile in mist with thunderstorm in the vicinity, ceiling broken at 900 feet, and overcast at 2,600 feet. The remarks noted lightning in the distant northeast.
Additional weather reporting stations to the east and north of the accident site were observing similar conditions, consistent with light to moderate rain, reduced visibility, and broken and overcast cloud layers.
According to a High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) numerical model data and satellite infrared images, near the final portion of the flight track cloud layers were likely present at 900 feet through 10,000 feet AGL, with an additional broken layer near 22,000 feet. The freezing level was identified at 8,285 feet, which was above the maximum altitude the airplane reached.
According to a review of weather radar and the base reflectivity imagery, during the final portion of the flight the airplane entered areas of light intensity echoes.
According to ForeFlight, the pilot created a route briefing for KCNI to KRMN with a proposed departure time of 17:00. There were no subsequent route briefings located by ForeFlight, nor were there any other weather briefings located for the accident flight by the FAA’s contract Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) provider, Leidos.
The weather briefing generated at 17:00 did not include any inflight weather advisories (Convective SIGMETs or G-AIRMETs). Had the pilot obtained an updated briefing closer to the departure time, VFR flight would not have been recommended based on the existing observations and forecast products.
The witness, who was about one mile from the accident site, recalled that it was a dark overcast night, but it was not windy or raining at the time she observed the accident.
The airplane crashed in wooded terrain near the top of rising terrain at an elevation of 1,250 feet MSL about 14 miles northeast of KCNI near Dawsonville, Georgia.
The wreckage was highly fragmented, located largely in one compact area, and the damage to trees in the vicinity were consistent with a near-vertical flight path into terrain.
Examination of the engine found no evidence of pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The propeller exhibited blade polishing, chordwise scratches, and S-bending, which was consistent with the engine operating under power at the time of impact.
According to FAA airman records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. He did not hold an instrument rating.
The pilot’s paper logbook was recovered in the airplane at the accident site and its contents were reviewed. The pilot had logged flights from Dec. 18, 2020, through Nov. 22, 2022. The pilot’s temporary airman certificate was located in the wreckage with a date of issue of Nov. 23, 2022. The pilot’s check ride was not logged and there were no flights logged after Nov. 22, 2022.
The pilot had logged 171 hours, with 71 hours as pilot-in-command. Most of the the pilot’s flight time was in the accident airplane. He logged a total of 3.7 simulated instrument hours and 4.4 hours at night. He had had not logged any flight time in actual instrument conditions.
Review of publicly available flight tracking websites found that several flights were logged in the accident airplane between Nov. 22, 2022, up to the accident date. Presuming the pilot, who owned the airplane, was the pilot-in-command for those flights. The review found that about 32 hours of flight time was accumulated, with 10 hours being at night. In the 30 days before the accident, the airplane was flown about 10 hours.
Probable Cause: The pilot’s decision to initiate a visual flight rules flight into night instrument meteorological conditions, resulting in a loss of control in-flight due to spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of qualifications and experience in night instrument meteorological conditions.
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This January 2023 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
I wanna see where I’m gonna land WHEN SxxT HITS THE FAN !!!
Night flite isn’t a risk but night off airport night landings are the stuff of nightmares.
If you elect to fly at night I won’t be in your way !
Unfortunately, the guys still out there walking around who are prone to behaving and acting in this manner – carelessly and recklessly – will never read these accident reports. They don’t take the art and science of flying seriously enough, I fear.
I am a big proponent of airframe parachute systems. Notwithstanding the idea that this will only promote bad judgement, etc. etc, you cannot deny that it could have saved this man from his poor judgement. And on the topic of night flying in a single propulsion aircraft, “DON’T”. I can’t think of a worse way to intentionally place yourself (and unfortunately, innocent passengers) in one of the most risky life threatening environments.in aviation.
Small single engine flying as a means of travel comes with very high risk levels whether you want to admit it or not. With today’s technology there could be much better back up and “save the day” devices. If Elon’s group can slow down a 60 story mega ton booster rocket at the last few seconds before impact and walk it over to a pin point holder, we should be able to come up with a similar way to reduce inpact with the ground to survivable levels. I guess the parachute is the cheapest and best we have available and even that is wrought with shortcomings and not very well received by the masses of pilots.
I don’t know why anyone would fly single engine, single pilot anywhere at night electively except for training. Too many things can go wrong..
Is there risk to night flight? Yes
Is there risk in daytime flight? Yes
What about IFR in IMC daytime flight? Yes
What about IFR in IMC night time flight? Yes
Are all airplanes the same? No (some are equipped differently)
Are all pilots the same risk? No
Are all locations the same risk? No
It is up to each pilot to decide the appropriate risk for a given flight in a given plane.
Give me Night flight VFR (no clouds unlimited vis) over flat well lit are with a Full Moon OVER a daytime VFR (just above minimum clouds and poor unlimited) over rough terrain.
Over 50 years of flying and instructing and I have not experienced any problems with night flying. Weather, current and forecasted, whether day or night, is important to be aware of, probably more so at night, especially the terrain over his route of flight. In this incident the pilot either ignored or didn’t comprehend the weather, or most likely decided to take a big risk. I’m familiar with that area and its hilly and mountainous terrain. Fly safe.
Textbook case of get-there-itis. International flight next day. “A man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest” from the Boxer, Simon & Garfinkle. Alas. RIP, pilot.
171 hrs TT and only 71 hrs PIC?
So the lady watched an airplane crash and just went about her business?
Yeah, that bugged me too. But how does a pilot, 6 weeks from his check ride with only 71 hours PIC launch into weather like this at night. You’d think such glaringly bad judgement would show up in his training too. I feel for instructors that have to tell risk prone people that their lack of judgment bars them from the left seat, regardless of their knowledge and skills. Get there-itis is taught in ADM. Preventing this must be the “Mission Impossible” for a CFI.
I looked up the pilot’s identity. He appears to have been a leader in his field — his death was widely noted. Perhaps a certain amount of arrogance and overconfidence contributed to his catastrophic decision-making, in addition to the work-induced pressures noted in the accident narrative.
She drove to the site to help, but couldn’t find the aircraft, and alerted the authorities. It’s in the witness statement.