The pilot stated that the morning before the flights he obtained and extensively reviewed weather resources consisting of METARS, Terminal Area Forecasts, and Daily Forecasts for all intended airports.
In preparation of the first flight he performed a standard preflight inspection of the Cessna 182 with a checklist and then departed on two separate, uneventful flights.
After landing at each airport he obtained abbreviated weather briefing data.
Before departing on the accident flight, he requested and received an IFR clearance from Ingalls Field Airport (KHSP) in Hot Springs, Virginia, to Richmond Executive-Chesterfield County Airport (KFCI).
The flight departed and before arrival he cancelled his IFR clearance and proceeded under VFR while performing a practice RNAV approach to Runway 15.
The pilot told investigators that he made a straight-in approach to the airport in Richmond. He added one notch of flaps when he arrived at the final approach fix (FAF), but he did not recall if he added another notch of flaps when he arrived at the decision height (DH).
He stated that he typically maintains 90 knots until the DH and then gradually slows to 70 knots until landing.
He reported that while in ground effect the winds were 5 to 10 knots with no turbulence and he had at least one notch of flaps extended.
During the flare to land the airplane abruptly pitched up without command and then nosed down, bouncing the airplane off the nose. The pilot added full throttle to abort the landing after the bounced landing and climbed to the traffic pattern altitude (he did not recall hearing the stall warning horn, but the event happened quickly).
He performed a right turn instead of a left turn due to the location of a rain cloud on the left side of the runway.
He remained in right traffic for Runway 15 and, when preparing to flare, a wind gust pushed the airplane across the runway.
He performed another go-around but, because the rain cloud was no longer on the left side of the runway, he made standard left traffic for Runway 15. The pilot landed uneventfully and taxied to the ramp.
Post-accident examination of the airplane was performed by an FAA airworthiness inspector, who reported that the nose landing gear was partially attached to the firewall and was pushed forward away from the firewall at an angle, and the bottom mounting points for the nose landing gear were broken.
He also reported that the floor by the rudder pedals was “wrinkled” and the rudder torque tube was bent.
There were no discrepancies with the aileron, rudder, or elevator primary flight controls. The rudder and elevator trims were both neutral.
Archived wind information was not available from the Richmond airport but wind at an airport about 11 nautical miles northeast about three minutes after the accident was from 230° at 8 knots.
A convective SIGMET, which implied updrafts and downdrafts, severe or greater turbulence, severe icing, and low-level wind shear, was issued for the Richmond airport area at 1255, or about 44 minutes before the accident flight departed.
The convective SIGMET indicated a developing line of thunderstorms with tops to 42,000 feet. Weather radar data showed thunderstorms and rain showers all around the area, including right near the accident airport. A review of the weather radar near the Richmond airport going back to 1230, which was about 1 hour 9 minutes before the accident flight departed, revealed thunderstorms and associated convective weather.
Probable Cause: The pilot’s delay in performing a go-around after a likely encounter with low-level wind shear, resulting in a hard landing. Contributing to the accident were the pilot’s failure to recognize the severity of the actual and forecasted weather near the airport and his continued approach to the airport with a thunderstorm and associated convective activity.
To download the final report. Click here. This will trigger a PDF download to your device.
This July 2023 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
Even though he canceclled IFR, the controller should have warned of the thunderstorm in the vicinity. From what I understand from the description, he ended up dealing with gusts typical of thunderstorms within 20 miles or so. Then there are gust fronts if you have a line of T-storms that are on the move.
When IFR, always check the weather at the airport of intended landing with ATC at or about an hour out (which is probably beyond ASOS/AWOS/TAF range) so you know if you have to divert. What if there had been a crash on field and the airport is now closed? What was your alternate (filed or not)?
Secondly: Keep in mind, WX is not Static, it is Dynamic. What was predicted an hour or more ago may not come close to the actual conditions once you get within the vicinity of the intended destination airport. And these reports telling aboud WX reported at some airport 10 or more miles away typcially have no relationship to actual at the airport where a problem occurred. You learn these things when you fly in the system (IFR) several times a year doing X/C trips. Ask any Part 135 pilot or airline captain about how Ma Nature behaves.
After reading this report …at first blush …it didn’t seem to meet the accident/incident reporting ‘threshold’ required by 14 CFR Part 830.
I wondered why the NTSB notification?
The uninjured pilot “landed uneventfully and taxied to the ramp”.
Sounds like none of the flight controls were compromised, and no persons or property on the ground were involved. So, the justification had to be “Substantial Damage”.
I thought damage was confined to the nose wheel …which according to NTSB’s definition of “Substantial Damage”, excludes damage to “landing gear, wheels, flaps, engine accessories, brakes or wingtips…”
When I read it again, I found what had to be the reason for NTSB involvement:
“He also reported that the floor by the rudder pedals was “wrinkled” and the rudder torque tube was bent.”
The ‘He’ in this case refers to the FAA airworthiness inspector who was also involved.
All this time, effort, and resources for a hard landing …and a bent torque tube?
…and we wonder why more significant cases …like the Francis/McSpadden crash, take over a year and a half to sort out.