About four hours into a repositioning flight of the Flight Design CTLS, and about six miles from his intended destination, the pilot contacted the tower controller and was informed that the airport was under instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions and that he was not cleared to land.
The pilot maneuvered to the southeast to ascertain whether he should return to his home airport or land at a nearby airport and wait for the weather to clear.
Shortly after departing the area en route to an alternate airport, the airplane lost engine power. The pilot attempted to restart the engine, however his efforts were unsuccessful.
He made a forced landing into a lake near Hungry Horse, Montana, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. He sustained minor injuries in the crash.
The pilot reported that there were no pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
He also told investigators that there was no engine roughness or warnings before the engine quit, and it sounded as if the airplane ran out of fuel.
He reported that he departed with 26.1 gallons of fuel and, according to the inflight computer, had about 5.72 gallons of remaining fuel when he arrived at the destination airport.
In the recommendation section of the NTSB Accident/Incident Reporting Form 6120.1, the pilot listed ways that the accident could have been prevented, including not relying on fuel management systems.
Probable Cause: The pilot’s inadequate fuel planning and improper in-flight decision-making, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
To download the final report. Click here. This will trigger a PDF download to your device.
This November 2023 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
Operating in marginal VFR conditions in Class D airspace is always challenging; especially when “Special VFR” (SVFR) clearances end up being a factor. This is one of the most infuriating and sad scenarios I’ve ever read. I am disappointed that ATC’s role is not mentioned in the NTSB’s Probable Cause and Findings.
I think folks get confused when they’re trying to connect the dots between Part 91.155 “Basic VFR Weather Minimums”, Part 91.157 “Special VFR Weather Minimums”, and the FAA’s Order JO 7110.65BB “Air Traffic Control” guidance for controllers. Maybe the FAA should produce a Venn diagram to show how they overlap.
Here’s what 7110.65BB, Chapter 7, Section 5. “Special VFR” says:
“SVR operations in weather conditions less than basic VFR minima are authorized …”
Note that “…are authorized” is not the same as “are required”. It then goes on to state:
“Do not authorize VFR operations beneath a broken or overcast ceiling within a surface area when the reported ceiling at the primary airport is less than 1,000 feet. A Special VFR clearance is required.”
In other words, a SVFR clearance is only “required” when the ceiling is up to and including 999’ AGL …not 1,200’ AGL. More to follow.
What’s really frustrating is when towers have their own local policy for how to manage them.
There’s no doubt that the 59-year-old, 540-hour Sport Pilot’s exceptionally poor ADM led to a wrecked, extremely well-equipped LSA; but the KGPI tower controller certainly didn’t help.
Regardless of his fuel issues–we can debate his reliance on the ‘inflight computer’ later–and his plan to scud run until he got closer to his destination, I have a big problem with following extract:
“I believe we were about 6 miles North of KGPI when we rechecked the AWOS and called in to the tower; ceiling of 1200 feet, 10 miles visibility, light and variable winds, runway 02 in use, information Delta. When I called into the tower, I was told that the airport was IFR, and they could not let me land. I acknowledged and then the controller told me I could fly around and wait for the weather to clear.”
NO; KGPI was not “IFR”. Overall, IFR conditions exist when the ceiling is below 1,000’ AGL and/or the visibility is less than 3 SM. The controller should have never uttered the phrase “IFR”. I wonder if their rotating beacon was still ‘lit’? It may have been ‘marginal’, but it was still VFR.
The controller should have explicitly told the pilot to “State YOUR intentions…”, not that he “could fly around and wait for the weather to clear”.
I hate the fact that SVFR clearances will be given “Only when requested by the pilot”. Was the controller playing the “Just Say the Magic Words” game, hoping the pilot would ask for a SVFR clearance?
Since controllers know real-time if IFR traffic is/isn’t a factor: How about adding “Special VFR clearance is/is not available” on the initial call? It might trigger a life-saving option the PIC hadn’t considered. The PIC would then still have to “request” it.
I also wonder if this controller was factoring in KGPI’s 4,000’ MSL/1,000’ AGL TPA, and decided the pilot wouldn’t be able enter the traffic pattern at ‘pattern altitude’ …and still meet the Class D airspace “500’ feet below” cloud clearance requirement?
If that’s the case, the pilot didn’t need to enter the pattern & stay at pattern altitude: It was still greater than 1,000’ ceiling and 3 SM visibility …he could have been cleared for a visual straight-in.
Either way …it still was not “IFR” …the pilot states that he should’ve asked for a SVFR clearance. I don’t think a Special VFR clearance was “required”.
Here’s hoping a controller reads this and pushes back; I’d like to know what I am missing.
I find it very strange that they were flying for 4+ hours, to an airport only 126 nm away.!!
So, what were they really doing all that time ?
All that in addition to my other comment.!
Always plan to use more fuel that usual, not less, and never plan to land with minimum fuel or less – even if the fuel that will be purchases upon landing is 50 cents cheaper per gallon.
Fifty cents a gallon, even at 50 gallons purchased, is twenty five bucks. Who in their right mind gambles even $10,000.00 against a twenty five dollar savings? The overwhelming number of fuel exhaustion crashes indicates this insane thought process is far too common. This is false economy at its worst. I’m not saying this was the case here, but these lack of fuel scenarios happen way too often.
I am going to join the ranks of those who call for the loss of one’s ticket for a period of time on the first fuel exhaustion accident, unless it is provable that the exhaustion was due to an known but unpreventable cause, such as a rapid fuel leak or a true mechanical/electrical failure that prevents fuel flow – improper switching of the fuel selector is not a valid excuse. To get the ticket back, 5 hours of fuel management training should be required.
A second fuel exhaustion incident by the same pilot should never happen.
I remember back in my CAP days when a pilot landed at an airport after dark in an Ercoupe with so little fuel that it ran out of fuel on the taxiway. He wanted to buy 5 gallons of fuel in order to fly to the airport where he should have landed, so he could fill up and fly back home. He wanted no record of his landing at this airport. Hmmm. We told him there was no way to get fuel at that time, and that he was better off calling his wife to be picked up or calling a taxi. He said he wife would be mad. We explained that it is better to have her mad and he be alive than risk a night flight with insufficient fuel and end up dead. Luckily, there was no (practical, ethical) way to get fuel anyway, so the choice was made for him.
I find it somewhat refreshing that this guy had the fuel to get to the airport and THEN had enough to fly towards an alternate. What the regs call for, for Day VFR is 30 minutes of reserves (fuel) when at the destination airport under VFR. So it is my opinion that the NTSB missed this and this was not so much “inadequate fuel planning” as opposed to not declaring an emergency, or recognizing that this was time for Special VFR or if Instrument rated, Contact Approach. And I think this is where “improper in-flight decision-making” fits.
Why? As I recall, ATC can’t offer you Special VFR or a Contact Approach, you have to request them.
I’ve always told my students if they can see the airport and running low on fuel, the password is “SPECIAL” VFR
He claims that he started the flight with 26.1 gallons. Was this from the Dynon fuel totalizer,? You can’t get that accuracy from a fuel stick.
All of the mfrs of these fuel totalizers caution to NOT use the ‘fuel remaining’ as the amount of fuel in the tank.!
So, after 4 hours, the totalizer displayed 5,72 gal remaining, which indicates a fuel burn of 5.1 gph not the 3.6 he claims was displayed.
So, maybe there was only 20 gallons in the tank.?
It appears that the totalizer may have not been caibrated and updated correctly.
He claims 400+ hrs i the aircraft.
*SMH*
Remember the three most useless things in Aviation:
1. Fuel in the Bowser
2. Sky above
3. Runway behind