General aviation pilots are often referred to as “weekend warriors,” rarely finding time to take to the skies except on the occasional weekend.
But what does that do for proficiency, especially for slow flight?
Most GA pilots believe they are good at it, but a new study suggests that for many private pilots, slow-flight proficiency may be eroding quietly — masked by infrequent flying, limited maneuver practice, and a strong sense of confidence that may not match reality.
Using a combination of NTSB accident data, ADS-B flight tracking, and a nationwide pilot survey, Douglas D. Boyd and Mark T. Scharf, researchers from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, set out to answer a simple question: Do private pilots fly enough to maintain proficiency?
The answer often appears to be no. Especially in slow flight.
Why Slow Flight Still Matters
Maneuvering flight accidents — many involving stalls in the traffic pattern — have long been overrepresented in fatal general aviation mishaps. The study confirms that reality hasn’t changed much.
Although the overall fatal accident rate for slow-flight-related events showed a modest downward trend after 2016, these accidents remain three to four times more likely to be fatal than accidents from other causes. Low altitude, low airspeed, and limited recovery margins leave little room for error.
Previous research has shown that slow-flight skill is among the first to degrade when flying becomes irregular. In a previous study, private pilots were evaluated eight months after passing their check rides. That study found that pilots who had flown at least 51 hours in the eight months since their check ride showed a higher success rate in completing the flight maneuvers compared to pilots who flew five hours or less over the same time.
Notably, of all the flight tasks re-examined, slow flight represented the one skill most degraded by low flight time, according to the researchers.
“This observation is important since this skill set is critical for safe operations during the traffic pattern/circuit when the airplane is being maneuvered at low speed and at low altitude prior to landing,” the researchers wrote. “In this phase of flight, poor slow-flight skills may result in an aerodynamic stall and a fatal mishap due to insufficient altitude to recover.”
Do most private pilots fly at least 51 hours in an eight-month period?
The new study says no.
Rather than relying only on pilot self-reporting, the researchers turned to ADS-B data. They tracked 90 privately owned, piston singles — each owned by a single non-instrument-rated private pilot — over an eight-month period through FlightAware.
They found that:
- 27% of the aircraft did not fly at all during the eight months.
- The median flight time was six hours.
- Only 6% of aircraft met or exceeded the 51-hour proficiency benchmark.
The researchers then looked for evidence of intentional slow-flight practice. Using conservative criteria — airspeed near VSO, adequate altitude, and clearing turns — they found it in only 9% of aircraft that were flying below the proficiency threshold.
In other words, most pilots who weren’t flying much also weren’t compensating by practicing slow-flight skills.
What Pilots Said Instead
The researchers then surveyed 126 private pilots across the U.S. The respondents were experienced aviators, with a median total time of more than 800 hours and two decades since earning their tickets.
On paper, this group looked far more active:
- Median reported flight time was 60 hours a year
- 57% to 60% reported recurrent training with an instructor at least annually
- 89% said they believed they flew enough to operate safely.
But even here, the cracks showed, according to the new research.
Only 25% of respondents reported enough annual flight time to meet the 51 hours to preserve proficiency. Most pilots believed that 36 to 50 hours a year was sufficient — below the level previously shown to prevent slow-flight skill decay.
The disconnect between ADS-B data and survey responses likely reflects a mix of factors, including optimism and the tendency to overestimate our own proficiency, according to the researchers.
None of this suggests that private pilots are reckless. In fact, the survey showed strong safety attitudes and widespread participation in recurrent training.
The risk is subtler.
Slow flight rarely announces its degradation. You don’t notice it at cruise altitude. It doesn’t show up on a smooth final — until it does, suddenly, and close to the ground. That’s why maneuvering flight accidents remain so unforgiving.
The study argues that irregular flying plus minimal maneuver-specific practice may help explain why these accidents persist.
Practical Takeaways for Pilots
The researchers say their findings point to several practical lessons every pilot can use:
- Private pilots should be educated to dispel the prevalent perception that they fly sufficiently to maintain proficiency, noting that currency is not proficiency.
- Pilots should be encouraged to engage in recurrent flight training every six months that includes slow flight and energy management, not just landings.
- Slow flight deserves intentional practice, especially if you fly infrequently.
- Objective data matters as ADS-B and flight tracking data reveal patterns we may not recognize in ourselves.
The Bottom Line
Most private pilots believe they fly enough to be safe. The data suggest that many don’t — at least not enough to reliably preserve slow-flight proficiency.
The good news? This is a solvable problem. It doesn’t require new technology or mandates, just honest self-assessment, structured practice, and a willingness to treat slow flight as the perishable skill it is.
Because the traffic pattern is no place to find out you’ve been rusty all along.
You can read the full study, “Irregularity of Flight and Slow-Flight Practice Evident for a Subset of Private Pilots — Potential Adverse Impact on Safe Operations,” at MDPI.com.
I am in PPL training on a Cessna 150L. I have a Gleim Private Pilot Training course with both options for 14 CFR Part 141and/or 14 CFR Part 61. It simulates the requirements of Dual Flight Training and Solo Pic with references to the required aeronautical knowledge training to complete PPL certification. I am using X-Plane (Gleim is an X-Plane plugin) and Microsoft Flight Simulator 2024. I plane to continue these lessons when I am not on the runway taking flights. I take the ‘Slow Flight and Stalls’ module (it is quite difficult to attain a high score in this module unless you practice it several times, also it is in a C 172 analog or glass) practice over and over and also I create a separate document and get a C150 in X-Plane and MSFT 2024 and duplicate the module as best I can at different locations. This reinforces understanding the aerodynamic principles underlying the maneuvers for me. I have also Sportys online PPL ground school which includes excellent video and documents relevant to the same. It transpired that I also purchased the King PPL Ground School (because it was required by the school which had the C150 I wanted to train in. I am using OBS Studio to record sessions and plan to podcast the results in the hope I will receive honest opinions on the effect of training in simulators as a method of maintaining currency for a PPL along with a minimum of actual flight). I have purchased an airplane which is not a Cessna to be able to fly a minimum of something like 100+ hrs a year, but I am interested in continuing to fly the C150 as part of maintaining proficiency. I print out documents, use a red pen go over and over Angle of Attack, Slow Flight and Stalls.
Conclusions based on those few reported failures, without knowing the thousands of successes. Truly many poor results are among those who dotted the Is and crossed the Ts without knowing why. Lack of innate mechanical understanding.
I doubt any conclusions that this report makes. With looking at only 90 flights in 4 large metro areas.
California has over 26,000 private and commercial pilots, and they review about 22 of the flights…..It looks to be a worthless exercise/ analysis .!!
This data, as presented, is both interesting and compelling.
At a personal level I know I would fail the study’s flight time requirements, thanks to my flight time being spread across multiple aircraft. Notwithstanding this aspect of the analysis, I wonder how many private pilots are truly working on skills rather than just boring holes in the sky?
I may not be the best example but I do try to execute at least one non-standard maneuver on every flight, be it a 360 degree turn in slow flight, a stall, a max performance slip, a simulated engine failure. Spread across my three aircraft, this allows me to feel that I’m at least trying to maintain proficiency.
Thankfully I’ve paid to keep a local instructor as a named pilot on my insurance policy – this allows me the comfort and confidence of being able to access his skills on a regular basis.
It also means that I subject myself to regular scrutiny of my own skills. I firmly believe we would be a safer community if we collectively made better use of readily-available resources to provide another critical set of eyes in the cockpit. It really is quite amazing to get feedback from an independent observer, to find out what we can do better.
GA, 135 & 121 aircraft normally have 3 controls.
Three controls, 6 chores to get around the patch SAFELY
G.A. CFI and the industry does not FULLY teach the above, in the all important first of the primary phase.
The result is too much of the landing phase is monkey see, monkey do training, instead of referring back to the aerodynamic reality of the physics involved in activities below 1.3 VSO.
Cheers from 60+ yr TW CFI
RRF
P.S. The wee rudder gets far too much credit for that which IT cannot do, while the all powerful aileronS are sorely neglected.
Slow flight practice per se, which is done at altitude and usually doesn’t involve vertical maneuvering, is not going to mean much unless the training and practice includes the maneuvering challenges in the real world. I.e. one of the most frequently noted factors leading to problems is a tailwind on base. If landing approaches don’t include training in those actual conditions, is anything getting accomplished?
If you accept the premise of rusty ‘weekend warriors’ needing more practice here, then what the heck good is the new PTS standard of recovering an airplane as soon as a stall warning horn goes off? That’s not a stall. You don’t want to take SOME airplanes fully into a stall but others — 172’s and the like — can be taken all the way into one and do a falling leaf maneuver with relative safety. Stalls turn into spins which turn into rapid altitude loss because of a lack of rudder inputs allowing the airplane to turn. Reminding oneself of that instinctive reaction to decisively use the rudder is where the specific proficiency is needed. Some airplanes need other finesse into the stall. It boils down to knowing one’s airplane, too.
As to ADS-B used for analysis, I just lost two close friends who lost control of a newly acquired TBM700 during a missed IFR approach as soon as power was applied. Poor ADM started the accident chain … the weather at the destination was nowhere near suitable for an approach and they never should have tried. When the MDA was reached, everything was good until power was applied to the PT6. Torque caused the airplane to turn (a known TBM issue) — likely startling the new TBM pilot — and things went bad from there. I analyzed the ADS-B data in depth and was amazed at what one could deduce during the <1 min period before they then crashed. I came away realizing that ADS-B can be useful for more than just keeping airplanes apart; it's a poor man's flight data recorder, if you will. Won't bring my friends back but sure is useful to analyze the problem and learn from it.
Good points all, Larry. I was lucky that I had an instructor who made me experience slow flight often. It was invaluable to feel: The marshmallow-like feeling, poor response to control inputs, the necessarily slow control inputs needed. He also let me fail at altitude, when it was recoverable. He also let me fail one time when I was on the cusp – ready to correct – without my knowing. He did that so I would never fail like that again, so that I would live to tell about it.
He told me at the outset he was there to keep us both alive, and that as a student, I was going to try to do things to kill us both. Not intentionally, but because I didn’t know any better. He taught me not only what not to do, but showed me why it would fail, hands on.
I am also glad that another instructor I used when Steve wasn’t available invited me to do spins with him in a 152. He was doing it for currency (if I recall correctly), I did it because I wanted to know what it was like. I asked to try to recover from a couple of spins, so I could experience it, which he allowed. I think he was surprised that I wanted to go up in the first place, and I was surprised that he let me recover spins.
I think too many CFIs do not allow students to experience failure, but failure is the best teacher of all. Not total, accident failure, but failure enough to know you don’t want to do that again, and have it proved by the same maneuver performed properly and safely without creating an actual emergency.
With only 90 aircraft being reviewed, using the ADSB data, I wonder how accurate this report is ?
With only about 1/2 of GA aircraft being equipped with ADSB-out and surveying only in large metro areas , how many flights would be doing slow flight anyway, except for some instructional flights. ?